---

Address in Reply to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech

My Lords, I want to say a brief word about constitutional matters. It has to be a brief word because the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has failed to give any indication of the way the Government's mind is moving. I understand that in due course there will be papers on methods of conducting our business and on the composition of the House. That will be the time to discuss in detail various matters that arise. However, it is possible to make one or two comments at this stage. We are regaled once again with the mantra that the other place is the supreme House of Parliament. I accept that it is in the sense that it controls supply, which must place it in a lead position, but I do not accept it if it is suggested that it is the lead House because it is more in touch with the needs and wishes of the people of this country. Certainly it is more in touch with some aspects; the aspects that come up in constituency surgeries. It does not follow that it is equally au fait with some of the wider issues, for instance, in law, order or industry, where this House has particular expertise. This House has two functions which it will always have to have: first, as a revising House. Most members of the Government say that it is a revising House and think that that is the end of the matter, but it is not. Secondly, it is also a delaying House, which has the power to cause the government of the day to think again. The revising function splits into two parts, which are not clearly defined. The Opposition suggest revisions that are clearly unacceptable to the Government of the day and are put forward merely to advertise their alternative point of view. However, a number of amendments are put forward that are intended to be and would be helpful if considered on their merits. I have been saddened during the past year in particular to notice how rarely it is that those suggestions are examined on their merits. There is a human nature element: if one served on the Bill team for some months and ended up with a flurry of work just before the debates, one would not be in a frame of mind to take kindly to someone's suggestion even if it happened to be a better idea than one previously thought, because of the prospect of the work involved in studying and giving effect to it. The delaying power is fundamental. We must have power to cause the Government to think again, otherwise we will have an elective dictatorship. Every government, going back to early Conservative Governments with whom I used to talk from time to time—at arm's length, of course—would like to get rid of any form of check or balance on their work. It is a natural reaction for any government, but it has to be resisted at all costs. The effort in 1945 to reduce the period of delay lacked any validity as a matter of law. It was probably a sensible arrangement because a delay of more than two Sessions in modern conditions is too much, but any suggestion that we take it further should be resisted to the end. One of the few clear indications given by the noble and learned Lord is that the Government look favourably on having a 60-sitting-day time limit for disposing of Bills. If the Opposition can control the House's business there will be no problem with that, but if the business of the House is to be controlled by the Government, I know from discussions with the usual channels that the bottom line is that the Government are entitled to decide what business should be discussed and when. As long as that is the case there cannot be a time limit, because they can simply say, "Well, you can have a day here and that's the lot". That will not do: it is a complete denial of the powers of this House. On the delay power I am completely in agreement with the Liberal Democrats that the day of the Salisbury convention has come and gone. We now have a majority of Labour Peers in this House and the rationale of the Salisbury convention was based on the in-built Tory majority. That has disappeared—