My Lords, El Niño is just one of a number of climatic drivers that can influence UK weather patterns. Any potential impacts will depend on how these drivers combine; this will be assessed in more detail later on in the year as forecasts evolve. The Government continue to take action to strengthen the UK’s resilience against severe

weather events. The national risk register details the wide-ranging impacts of severe weather to ensure that comprehensive contingency plans are in place.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for all the work he does as chair of the National Preparedness Commission and for what he is now doing in respect of policing. It is crucial to retain resilience as we go through the reforms to police forces and local government restructuring. The Government are actively assessing the impact of police and local government changes on local resilience forums to ensure that communities remain supported before, during and after emergencies. We are strengthening the local resilience forum model to make sure it is robust and fit for the future. We have allocated £2.5 million of trailblazer funding to test approaches that strengthen local leadership and accountability.

My Lords, the National Cyber Security Centre is closely monitoring the situation in the Middle East and directly engaging with critical sectors, providing immediate and specific information and advice. It has issued an alert, urging all organisations, especially those with assets or supply chains in the region, to remain vigilant. While it is likely that the direct cyber threat from Iran to the UK has not changed, NCSC advises organisations to strengthen their cyber security posture due to the fast-evolving nature of the conflict. The National Protective Security Authority also issued updated guidance last year on countering the threat of sabotage, helping organisations to protect their sites from physical threats.

The Government works with National Energy System Operator (NESO) to assess and prepare for space weather risks to the power grid and telecoms, supported by the Space Weather Impact for Future Electricity System Resilience (SWIFTER) projects will provide an assessment of the probability of impacts. A severe geomagnetic storm could generate uneven geoelectric fields across the UK, with effects possible nationwide depending on geology and grid configuration. Resulting geomagnetically induced currents may disrupt power systems and cause local outages, which could in turn affect telecoms and GNSS based timing.

While no plans exist specifically for a Carrington scale event, any large-scale outage would follow established national arrangements, including public preparedness guidance, Pre-Agreed Written Science (PAWS) scientific advice, and Cabinet Office planning to support access to essential services.

The earned settlement model, proposed in ‘A Fairer Pathway to Settlement’, is currently subject to a public consultation, running until 12 February 2026.

The consultation seeks views on whether there should be transitional arrangements for those already on a pathway to settlement, in order to ease the impact of changes for particular groups or preserve already afforded permissions by the previous system. No transitional arrangements have been decided upon yet.

Details of the earned settlement model, including any transitional arrangements for those already in the UK, will be finalised following that consultation. The final model will also be subject to economic and equality impact assessments, which we have committed to publish in due course.

My Lords, Exercise Pegasus tested our ability to respond to a pandemic, involving all nations of the UK and thousands of participants. Evaluation and lesson identification is under way for the first three phases, with interim findings incorporated into the draft pandemic preparedness strategy due to be published in early 2026. The final exercise phase, focusing on recovery, is planned for this summer. The Government have committed to communicating the findings through the post-exercise report this winter.

To clarify, five substation fires were reported to Government in the last five years, not four. In 2025, Government was informed of the fire at North Hyde Substation in Hayes in March, the fire at Aberdeen Place Substation in Maida Vale in April, and the fires at Exeter Substation and St John’s Wood Substation in May. In September 2021, Government was informed of the fire at Sellindge Substation.

Although rare, fires occasionally occur on the electricity network. DESNZ was not notified of the fires in Huddersfield and near Lakeside Retail Park in Brynmawr as these incidents fell below well-established incident reporting thresholds with industry. These thresholds are set so Government can monitor any potential or actual impact to customer supplies and act where necessary.

Great Britain has a highly resilient energy network, and Government takes the protection of energy infrastructure very seriously.

4 substation fires have been reported to Government over the last 5 years. Such incidents are reported to Government when there is a potential or actual impact to customer supplies.

The Government works closely with the energy industry to ensure robust response plans are in place to mitigate the impacts of energy disruption.

My Lords, the Government’s first duty is to protect our national security and keep our country safe. Defra recognises that the drinking water supply is a potential target for hostile actors. It works with water companies and partners across government to understand and monitor threats to water supply and to consider responses as appropriate to protect the security of our water system.

My Lords, I extend my sympathies to all those affected by what happened at Heathrow. I also wish to praise the efforts of all the people who worked so hard to get Heathrow up and running again. The Government work continuously with industry, regulators and other stakeholders to improve and maintain the resilience and security of energy infrastructure and to minimise the risk of unplanned outages. Alongside Ofgem, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State commissioned the National Energy System Operator to carry out a review to investigate the power disruption to Heathrow. Once we have all the information, we will be best placed to understand any wider lessons to be learned on energy resilience and security for critical national infrastructure.

Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for this Government. The Home Secretary has brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry to see what can be done to break the business model of mobile phone thieves, and the Government have included measures in the forthcoming Crime and Policing Bill. The Home Office will ensure that all parties work together so that technical innovations, policing and government efforts reduce this crime.

The 2024 to 2029 United Kingdom antimicrobial resistance (AMR) national action plan sets out challenging commitments and targets to confront the risk of AMR across the breadth of human, animal, and environmental health. The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs works closely with the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, which monitors fungicide resistance development in cereal pathogens, to inform disease management strategies.

Whilst the 2023 National Risk Register classifies AMR as a chronic risk, the Government recognises the potential for AMR to manifest acutely, for example, as an outbreak of a resistant bacterial or fungal infection. The Department of Health and Social Care commissioned the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) to produce some realistic worst-case scenarios of the acute risks that AMR poses in the UK. The developed scenarios include bacterial and fungal pathogens and are based upon real-world experience. The UKHSA will now develop plans to use these scenarios to inform incident response and preparedness plans.

Integrated pest management (IPM) helps support sustainable agriculture and combat pesticide resistance by diversifying the tools used to handle pests. The Government supports farmers’ use of IPM through the Sustainable Farming Initiative’s paid actions. These include optimising chemical pesticide use through precision application. Last year we launched a new IPM guidance page on gov.uk which provides clear and practical information about IPM to support planning and decision making.

We work closely with the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, which monitors fungicide resistance development in cereal pathogens, to inform disease management strategies.

Antifungal resistance in humans, which is in part driven by the use of fungicides, is increasing globally and in the UK. Fungicides must be used responsibly to reduce potential risk to public health. The Government is committed to investing in research and development to advance its understanding of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and how it spreads. The AMR National Action Plan’s top 10 research priorities include questions that seek to understand what drives resistance beyond antimicrobials, such as the risks associated with the use of antifungals on human health.

The UK Plant Health Risk Register is a comparison tool used to assess the risk to the UK of non-native plant pests to both cultivated plants and those in the wider environment. It is used to prioritise actions that industry and Government can take to reduce the threat posed by each pest. Resistant strains of plant pests are not evaluated in the risk register because 1) the metrics used to assess non-native plant pest species are not appropriate to the assessment of resistant plant pest strains, and 2) plant health legislation applies to non-native pest species rather than strains of species that are already present in the UK. However, Defra has funded a Review of Antibiotic Use in Crops, Associated Risk of Antimicrobial Resistance and Research Gaps (copy attached) and collaborates with international organisations, such as via the International Plant Protection Convention, on approaches to AMR.

The 2024 to 2029 antimicrobial resistance (AMR) national action plan (NAP) is a United Kingdom-wide plan, setting out the challenging commitments and targets for the next five years to confront AMR.

The NAP programme is made up of eight implementation programmes that are responsible for delivering their implementation plans, which collectively contribute to meeting the commitments within the NAP. Each implementation programme records and manages risks within their own governance structures. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland each have their own implementation programmes that they manage.

Risks that are deemed cross-cutting to the NAP are recorded within the programme’s UK-wide risk register, owned by the Department. These cross-cutting risks are monitored and discussed at the two programmes delivery boards, which are responsible for monitoring implementation of the NAP, to determine mitigating actions.

High-level, challenging programme risks can be escalated up to the UK AMR Strategy Board, members of which include senior officials from across the One Health sector and all four nations of the UK, who are responsible for providing strategic direction for mitigating large scale risks that jeopardise overall programme delivery.

I am pleased to tell my noble friend that no viable fully 3D-printed firearms have been found by law enforcement in the United Kingdom. In 2023, there were 25 instances where police seized 3D-printed component parts or other items associated with 3D printing of firearms.

We are working closely with international partners

following the breakage of two subsea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea a fortnight ago. It is important that we let those investigations run their course. Subsea cables are critical to UK telecommunications digital infrastructure, and we are committed to maintaining and enhancing the security and resilience of that infra- structure. We will continue to co-ordinate with security partners, the subsea cables industry and international bodies on this issue.

Since the launch of the UK Government’s emergency alert system, the capability has been deployed twice: in February in Plymouth to aid an evacuation effort following the discovery of an unexploded World War II bomb; and in April this year as part of flood mitigation in Cumbria. At present, a second national test is not scheduled; however, the Government will continue to ensure the resilience of the system through regular technical testing and consider national tests as appropriate.