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Lords committee stage first day. Clauses 1 to 5 agreed to. Clause 6, as amended, agreed to. Clauses 7 to 14 agreed to.
Lords committee stage first day. Clauses 1 to 5 agreed to. Clause 6, as amended, agreed to. Clauses 7 to 14 agreed to.
I add my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords for trying to make sense of what we all agree is a very difficult area. We are trying to come to a definition of high-risk areas. As we have heard in the examples today, you cannot...
I add my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords for trying to make sense of what we all agree is a very difficult area. We are trying to come to a definition of high-risk areas. As we have heard in the examples today, you cannot...
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for introducing this group. I am generally supportive of the principles she is introducing, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I particularly enjoyed trying to get my head round ten septillion, however many zeros that...
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for introducing this group. I am generally supportive of the principles she is introducing, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I particularly enjoyed trying to get my head round ten septillion, however many zeros that...
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for introducing this group; as it is the final group of the day, I will keep my remarks brief.
Amendments 15A and 15B in the names of my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seek to allow regulatory oversight of...
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for introducing this group; as it is the final group of the day, I will keep my remarks brief.
Amendments 15A and 15B in the names of my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seek to allow regulatory oversight of...
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Markham on 8 January (HL1364), how many GPs adopted those medical record markers since (1) the guidance on firearm digital markers was produced, and (2) the memorandum of understanding was signed.
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Markham on 8 January (HL1364), how many GPs adopted those medical record markers since (1) the guidance on firearm digital markers was produced, and (2) the memorandum of understanding was signed.
The digital firearms marker was rolled out to all general practices in England in May 2023 and NHS England is exploring the most effective way to report on its use. Information is currently not available in a format to be able to provide this detail. The memorandum of understanding was signed in 2019, and therefore predates the digital marker and we do not hold data from that time.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will publish data on how many doctors have adopted the software for markers on the medical notes of firearm certificate holders.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will publish data on how many doctors have adopted the software for markers on the medical notes of firearm certificate holders.
A digital version of the firearms marker has been rolled out to all general practices in England, and this was completed in May 2023.
When the police inform the general practitioner (GP) that the patient has been granted a firearms licence, the GP adds the appropriate clinical code to a patient’s medical record. The marker is used throughout the five-year validity of the firearm certificate and automatically highlights to the GP when patients recorded as firearms certificate holders or applicants are diagnosed with relevant medical conditions, such as depression or dementia.
The British Medical Association has produced guidance for GPs about firearm digital marker use and signed a memorandum of understanding in 2019 with the National Police Chiefs Council and the Home Office which encouraged GPs to place a firearms flag on patient records when requested.
To ask His Majesty's Government what consideration has been given to making it simpler to switch off access to patient health records through the NHS app, particularly for vulnerable groups.
To ask His Majesty's Government what consideration has been given to making it simpler to switch off access to patient health records through the NHS app, particularly for vulnerable groups.
The Government wants people to be able to have access to their own records if they choose to do so. There is widespread international consensus about the benefits to patients and the effectiveness of the health system in providing digital on-demand access to personal health information.
For most, online record access is beneficial, but for a minority, having access could cause harm or distress. NHS England is taking an active approach to ensuring safe and secure patient record access, seeking to identify and provide additional protections to vulnerable people if they request access to their medical records online.
NHS England has engaged extensively with at-risk groups, professional bodies, patient groups, charities and safeguarding leads to support general practice and patients in preparing for this change safely and effectively. Communication packs have been provided to over 50 charities that support at-risk individuals. NHS Digital has published guidance in an online-only format for organisations, Supporting victims and survivors of domestic or sexual abuse, to support people when accessing their personal health information online.
Before viewing their record in the NHS App, users are advised what to do if they are being pressured to share their information. Patients can prevent access by disabling their National Health Service login with a simple online process or can ask their general practitioner (GP) for the details of specific consultations or treatment decisions to be redacted. When an individual first requests access, they cannot see information already recorded; they will only be able to access information recorded from that point onwards.
The expert safeguarding group has identified theoretical risks, which have fed into NHS England’s patient and GP communications packs and advice, messaging on the NHS App and NHS.uk and improvements made by GP IT system suppliers.
More than 23 million patients have viewed their records over nine million times, with no significant incidents relating to personal safety or security reported. Lower-level incidents, such as people finding out their diagnosis before being told by a clinician, have been reported, and some issues have been investigated and classed as low-risk and/or resolved.
NHS England continues to monitor this and would take action if an issue was identified or raised.
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the risk of being pressured into showing confidential medical records on the NHS App to third parties faced by (1) patients requesting covert contraception forbidden in their home or relationship, (2) patients who are suffering domestic abuse, and (3)...
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the risk of being pressured into showing confidential medical records on the NHS App to third parties faced by (1) patients requesting covert contraception forbidden in their home or relationship, (2) patients who are suffering domestic abuse, and (3)...
The Government wants people to be able to have access to their own records if they choose to do so. There is widespread international consensus about the benefits to patients and the effectiveness of the health system in providing digital on-demand access to personal health information.
For most, online record access is beneficial, but for a minority, having access could cause harm or distress. NHS England is taking an active approach to ensuring safe and secure patient record access, seeking to identify and provide additional protections to vulnerable people if they request access to their medical records online.
NHS England has engaged extensively with at-risk groups, professional bodies, patient groups, charities and safeguarding leads to support general practice and patients in preparing for this change safely and effectively. Communication packs have been provided to over 50 charities that support at-risk individuals. NHS Digital has published guidance in an online-only format for organisations, Supporting victims and survivors of domestic or sexual abuse, to support people when accessing their personal health information online.
Before viewing their record in the NHS App, users are advised what to do if they are being pressured to share their information. Patients can prevent access by disabling their National Health Service login with a simple online process or can ask their general practitioner (GP) for the details of specific consultations or treatment decisions to be redacted. When an individual first requests access, they cannot see information already recorded; they will only be able to access information recorded from that point onwards.
The expert safeguarding group has identified theoretical risks, which have fed into NHS England’s patient and GP communications packs and advice, messaging on the NHS App and NHS.uk and improvements made by GP IT system suppliers.
More than 23 million patients have viewed their records over nine million times, with no significant incidents relating to personal safety or security reported. Lower-level incidents, such as people finding out their diagnosis before being told by a clinician, have been reported, and some issues have been investigated and classed as low-risk and/or resolved.
NHS England continues to monitor this and would take action if an issue was identified or raised.
To ask His Majesty's Government what advice is being provided to domestic abuse survivors and other at-risk groups about medical apps they have downloaded on their devices.
To ask His Majesty's Government what advice is being provided to domestic abuse survivors and other at-risk groups about medical apps they have downloaded on their devices.
The Government wants people to be able to have access to their own records if they choose to do so. There is widespread international consensus about the benefits to patients and the effectiveness of the health system in providing digital on-demand access to personal health information.
For most, online record access is beneficial, but for a minority, having access could cause harm or distress. NHS England is taking an active approach to ensuring safe and secure patient record access, seeking to identify and provide additional protections to vulnerable people if they request access to their medical records online.
NHS England has engaged extensively with at-risk groups, professional bodies, patient groups, charities and safeguarding leads to support general practice and patients in preparing for this change safely and effectively. Communication packs have been provided to over 50 charities that support at-risk individuals. NHS Digital has published guidance in an online-only format for organisations, Supporting victims and survivors of domestic or sexual abuse, to support people when accessing their personal health information online.
Before viewing their record in the NHS App, users are advised what to do if they are being pressured to share their information. Patients can prevent access by disabling their National Health Service login with a simple online process or can ask their general practitioner (GP) for the details of specific consultations or treatment decisions to be redacted. When an individual first requests access, they cannot see information already recorded; they will only be able to access information recorded from that point onwards.
The expert safeguarding group has identified theoretical risks, which have fed into NHS England’s patient and GP communications packs and advice, messaging on the NHS App and NHS.uk and improvements made by GP IT system suppliers.
More than 23 million patients have viewed their records over nine million times, with no significant incidents relating to personal safety or security reported. Lower-level incidents, such as people finding out their diagnosis before being told by a clinician, have been reported, and some issues have been investigated and classed as low-risk and/or resolved.
NHS England continues to monitor this and would take action if an issue was identified or raised.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether any concerns about risk to personal safety and security have been identified by the expert safeguarding group reviewing the implementation of NHS App.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether any concerns about risk to personal safety and security have been identified by the expert safeguarding group reviewing the implementation of NHS App.
The Government wants people to be able to have access to their own records if they choose to do so. There is widespread international consensus about the benefits to patients and the effectiveness of the health system in providing digital on-demand access to personal health information.
For most, online record access is beneficial, but for a minority, having access could cause harm or distress. NHS England is taking an active approach to ensuring safe and secure patient record access, seeking to identify and provide additional protections to vulnerable people if they request access to their medical records online.
NHS England has engaged extensively with at-risk groups, professional bodies, patient groups, charities and safeguarding leads to support general practice and patients in preparing for this change safely and effectively. Communication packs have been provided to over 50 charities that support at-risk individuals. NHS Digital has published guidance in an online-only format for organisations, Supporting victims and survivors of domestic or sexual abuse, to support people when accessing their personal health information online.
Before viewing their record in the NHS App, users are advised what to do if they are being pressured to share their information. Patients can prevent access by disabling their National Health Service login with a simple online process or can ask their general practitioner (GP) for the details of specific consultations or treatment decisions to be redacted. When an individual first requests access, they cannot see information already recorded; they will only be able to access information recorded from that point onwards.
The expert safeguarding group has identified theoretical risks, which have fed into NHS England’s patient and GP communications packs and advice, messaging on the NHS App and NHS.uk and improvements made by GP IT system suppliers.
More than 23 million patients have viewed their records over nine million times, with no significant incidents relating to personal safety or security reported. Lower-level incidents, such as people finding out their diagnosis before being told by a clinician, have been reported, and some issues have been investigated and classed as low-risk and/or resolved.
NHS England continues to monitor this and would take action if an issue was identified or raised.
The Government want people to have access to their own records. For most, online record access is beneficial but for a minority, having access could cause harm or distress. In many cases, practices can identify these patients and ensure that safeguarding processes are in place. Furthermore, to access the NHS app, users must prove their identity through the NHS log-in and, before entering their record, are advised what to do if they are being pressurised to share their information.
The Government want people to have access to their own records. For most, online record access is beneficial but for a minority, having access could cause harm or distress. In many cases, practices can identify these patients and ensure that safeguarding processes are in place. Furthermore, to access the NHS app, users must prove their identity through the NHS log-in and, before entering their record, are advised what to do if they are being pressurised to share their information.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what measures they have put in place to mitigate the risk of people being coerced into showing their confidential medical records to third parties as records become universally available through the NHS app.
The noble Lord is absolutely correct on getting that balance right between the two; that is why the NHS has a safeguarding reference group on exactly this, which has been putting in protections as well as messaging patients, telling them to be aware and that they have the opportunity to redact their records if they are concerned. There are other features, such as multi-factor authentication and making sure that, for log-in with facial ID, you cannot have anyone else in the picture, to ensure that people are not being coerced. So, there are a number of measures in place, but I completely agree that we need to keep them under review with user groups checking all the way.
The noble Lord is absolutely correct on getting that balance right between the two; that is why the NHS has a safeguarding reference group on exactly this, which has been putting in protections as well as messaging patients, telling them to be aware and that they have the opportunity to redact their records if they are concerned. There are other features, such as multi-factor authentication and making sure that, for log-in with facial ID, you cannot have anyone else in the picture, to ensure that people are not being coerced. So, there are a number of measures in place, but I completely agree that we need to keep them under review with user groups checking all the way.
My Lords, the design goals for the NHS app should be to make it as easy and frictionless as possible for legitimate users to access the system, while making it as difficult and frictionful as possible for people trying to gain unauthorised access. But there is a natural tendency to focus on the first part of this equation as developers believe in the systems they build and find it hard to put themselves in the shoes of the cunning and resourceful attackers who will try to break them. Given this dynamic, can the Minister confirm that the NHS has a red team tasked with trying to identify all possible vectors of attack on the NHS app, and that the requisite resources will be put into mitigating any risks that they identify?
My noble friend is correct. As the noble Lord, Lord Allan, said, there are many good uses for the app and data. As we all probably know, AI is only as good as the data that underlies it. The good situation we have—it is lovely to have a story for Christmas cheer—is that our 50 million primary care and hospital records are probably second to none around the world. We are already using that to positive effect, such as for image reading and using AI for cancer scans and strokes. We can also use that data for intelligent screening and, in future, for cause and effect to find cures, hopefully one day even for dementia.
My noble friend is correct. As the noble Lord, Lord Allan, said, there are many good uses for the app and data. As we all probably know, AI is only as good as the data that underlies it. The good situation we have—it is lovely to have a story for Christmas cheer—is that our 50 million primary care and hospital records are probably second to none around the world. We are already using that to positive effect, such as for image reading and using AI for cancer scans and strokes. We can also use that data for intelligent screening and, in future, for cause and effect to find cures, hopefully one day even for dementia.
My Lords, with the abundance of health data available to the NHS, what future technologies are being developed to identify patterns and trends to improve patient outcomes and reduce the pressure on the NHS?
Absolutely; it is about getting that balance correct. I welcomed the support of all sides of the House when we were introducing the FDP. A lot of work was done with noble Lords on that. The fact that the federated data platform was as well received as it was in the circumstances is because of support from all Members of the House on all sides, knowing the vital role of data in improving health outcomes.
Absolutely; it is about getting that balance correct. I welcomed the support of all sides of the House when we were introducing the FDP. A lot of work was done with noble Lords on that. The fact that the federated data platform was as well received as it was in the circumstances is because of support from all Members of the House on all sides, knowing the vital role of data in improving health outcomes.
While it is obviously important to control confidentiality of patient data, it is vital to be able to use data for medical research. Much research, such as epidemiological research, the relationship between smoking and ill health—obesity, diabetes and all sorts of diseases—would not be known much about unless we were able to handle patient data. In the rush to control, let us make sure we can still do research with patient data.
The fundamental principle underlying all this is that none of the data leaves the control. The data controllers today—be it GPs, the NHS or the hospital—stay as they are, and any use of that data has to be approved outside of that. The noble Baroness is absolutely correct. We want to make sure that it is not used for any purposes that are not going to improve health outcomes, such as the ones we have talked about.
The fundamental principle underlying all this is that none of the data leaves the control. The data controllers today—be it GPs, the NHS or the hospital—stay as they are, and any use of that data has to be approved outside of that. The noble Baroness is absolutely correct. We want to make sure that it is not used for any purposes that are not going to improve health outcomes, such as the ones we have talked about.
My Lords, following the question from my noble friend Lord Allan about a red team, in the past not health data but personal financial data has been sold by subsidiaries or contractors of UK firms based abroad. I notice that we now have a deal with America on health data and GDPR. Is that true for other countries, such as India? Personal data, particularly medical data, would be seen as very valuable.
Clinical trials are among the key areas that are vital to the life sciences industry. We are all aware that, post-Covid, we were falling a bit behind. I am glad to say that now we have improved, so that 80% of the time we are doing the clinical responses in time. We can still do better; that should be 100% but 80% is good. Most importantly, our data is
the envy of the world. Just to give noble Lords an example, about 90% of our hospital records are digitised. In Germany, it is less than 1%.
Clinical trials are among the key areas that are vital to the life sciences industry. We are all aware that, post-Covid, we were falling a bit behind. I am glad to say that now we have improved, so that 80% of the time we are doing the clinical responses in time. We can still do better; that should be 100% but 80% is good. Most importantly, our data is
the envy of the world. Just to give noble Lords an example, about 90% of our hospital records are digitised. In Germany, it is less than 1%.
My Lords, could my noble friend update the House on where we are with sharing data—in particular, the outcomes of clinical trials—with our European partners?
In terms of averting it, there are some of the measures I was talking about. For instance, with facial recognition, if anyone else is seen in the picture, it disregards it, so that you cannot have someone else holding it or holding their head in to do it. If the person’s eyes are shut—if someone is trying to do it while you are asleep—it does not work either. Those safeguards are in place, as well as multi-factor authentication, so that if anyone tries to change their details by email or whatever, it comes back to them. We have worked with user groups on this. I will come back to the noble Baroness specifically on the Ministry of Justice conversations, but we are doing a lot in this space.
In terms of averting it, there are some of the measures I was talking about. For instance, with facial recognition, if anyone else is seen in the picture, it disregards it, so that you cannot have someone else holding it or holding their head in to do it. If the person’s eyes are shut—if someone is trying to do it while you are asleep—it does not work either. Those safeguards are in place, as well as multi-factor authentication, so that if anyone tries to change their details by email or whatever, it comes back to them. We have worked with user groups on this. I will come back to the noble Baroness specifically on the Ministry of Justice conversations, but we are doing a lot in this space.
My Lords, easy access to medical records on the NHS app is indeed positive and helpful to many, but of course there are parents whose abusive spouse or partner might use that sensitive clinical information to undermine legal cases of custody of dependants in the family courts. What discussions have taken place with the Ministry of Justice to assess both this risk and how to avert it?
The noble Lord is absolutely correct. Digital resource is well sought after. I was approving something just the other day which gives us more flexibility in that space, because sometimes you have to pay over and above to get people on it. As we all agree, this is vital to the future of what we are trying to do.
The noble Lord is absolutely correct. Digital resource is well sought after. I was approving something just the other day which gives us more flexibility in that space, because sometimes you have to pay over and above to get people on it. As we all agree, this is vital to the future of what we are trying to do.
My Lords, digital transformation of the NHS at pace is being held back by the number of vacancies for digital roles within the NHS, particularly when many people are going over to the private sector for higher pay. What could the Government do to deal with this, particularly regarding the inflexible Agenda for Change?
Patient records is what the federated data platform is very good at, in terms of drawing data and information from all sorts of sources into one place, so it is always in the ownership of the person, the GP or the individual place. You can make your data available to the private care providers, if you are having an operation with them, for instance, but the data always remains within the NHS and in the ownership of the person.
Patient records is what the federated data platform is very good at, in terms of drawing data and information from all sorts of sources into one place, so it is always in the ownership of the person, the GP or the individual place. You can make your data available to the private care providers, if you are having an operation with them, for instance, but the data always remains within the NHS and in the ownership of the person.
My Lords, as more people who are able to are switching between the National Health Service and private medical care for specific operations, is the Minister confident that relevant information is then transferred back to a single patient record? This will be very important if, for instance, somebody needs emergency care or is involved in an accident. Is the data all being kept in one place?
The noble Baroness is absolutely correct. While I think everybody would say that 90% digitisation is pretty good—it is not 100%, but it is pretty good—always making sure people are talking to each other is often the issue. I am sure we have all had examples of that. That is what the federated data platform helps to do, in terms of drawing it all in. For example, Chelsea and Westminster has put what was on 10 different spreadsheets and records into one place. We are getting a lot better at that, but is it perfect and seamless? No, there is still some work to be done.
The noble Baroness is absolutely correct. While I think everybody would say that 90% digitisation is pretty good—it is not 100%, but it is pretty good—always making sure people are talking to each other is often the issue. I am sure we have all had examples of that. That is what the federated data platform helps to do, in terms of drawing it all in. For example, Chelsea and Westminster has put what was on 10 different spreadsheets and records into one place. We are getting a lot better at that, but is it perfect and seamless? No, there is still some work to be done.
My Lords, following the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, is the Minister confident, in all the talk about
advances in technology, that data-sharing within the NHS is fit for purpose? We frequently encounter an apparent disconnect between different departments in the NHS, or different levels of care, where information which should be available to everybody is palpably not or, if it is, it is not being taken any notice of.