In relation to the Soldier Conditioning Review, personnel are marked on the system as ‘red’ when they have areas of physical fitness they need to improve. If they are marked as ‘green’ it means they do not have any specific areas of physical fitness development / improvement and are at an adequate baseline. Personnel are marked as ‘Amber’ on the system if the individual needs to take another assessment in the next two months.

The table below shows the number and proportion of Regular and Reserve soldiers that took the Soldier Conditioning Review who were graded as ‘Green’ or ‘Amber’ and ‘All other grades’.

Notes/Caveats:

1. This data was sourced by the Army’s Personnel Policy Directorate as at 17 May 2024. The data has been taken from a live system and therefore could be subject to change.

2. The figures are single Service estimates based on management information which is not gathered for statistical purposes or subject to the same level of scrutiny as official statistics produced by Defence Statistics. The figures provided may therefore be subject to data quality issues affecting their accuracy.

3. The Soldier Conditioning Review was implemented in 2019. Prior to April 2022 the data was recorded in a different manner due to a change in how the tests were recorded and captured on the system, therefore this information is not available in the format requested.

The below table shows the number of Regular and Reserve soldiers who took the Role Fitness test who passed and failed in each year since the test was introduced, broken down by ground close combat troops (GCC) and non-ground close combat troops (NON-GCC) and proportion rate of pass / fails.

Notes/Caveats:

1. This data was sourced by the Army’s Personnel Policy Directorate as at 17 May 2024. The data has been taken from a live system and therefore could be subject to change.

2. The figures are single Service estimates based on management information which is not gathered for statistical purposes or subject to the same level of scrutiny as official statistics produced by Defence Statistics. The figures provided may therefore be subject to data quality issues affecting their accuracy.

3. Regular Non-Ground Closed Combat (GCC) figures for 2021 – Role Fitness testing (RFT(S)) did not start until Sep 2021 and therefore fewer Regular Army personnel will have been tested.

4. Reserve Non-GCC for 2021 – RFT(S) testing did not start until Apr 2022 and therefore Non-GCC figures should not contain results for the Army Reserve.

5. Figures represent Regular and Reserve Army personnel.

6. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

7. All Army personnel are included irrespective of the Top Level Budget (TLB) that they are part of, for example, Army personnel serving within the Royal Navy command.

8. Ground Close Combat includes the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) and the Infantry.

9. Year is based on calendar year.

1. The Role Fitness Test can only be broken down by ‘Pass’ or ‘Fail’. The system includes categories of ‘N/A’ and ‘Exempt’ in the ‘Passed’ Figure. This cannot be broken down further without incurring disproportionate cost.

1. An individual will be exempt if they meet the exemption policy for RFT(S), which is that they have a medical condition precluding them from attempting the test.

2. A ‘N/A’ marker for individuals is applied when they are out of scope for RFT(S) testing. This will include those in a non-deployable HQ role, Military Provost Guard Service (MPGS), staff at a University Officer Training Corps (UOTC), Elite and Professional Athletes, and Reservists on specific contracts that do not require completion of the Individual Training Requirement.

Discharge as of Right (DAOR) is discussed during the candidate career discussion and the candidate Basic Training Readiness preparation briefs. Parents/guardians are welcome to attend these sessions and ask any questions.

DAOR information is also provided in the candidate final offer, in the Terms and Conditions of Service section, which parents/guardians can view via the application portal. DAOR is touched upon in the Commanding Officer Welcome Brief at Army Foundation College Harrogate for the U18 recruits and their parents/guardians who attend that establishment.

There have been three investigations since July 2022 related to Service personnel's suspected engagement in transactional sex in Kenya. Each of which resulted in "no case to answer".

It is expected that the Army Trials Unit will be established in September 2024, and fully operational by January 2025. The Commanding Officer, in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, will be appointed in accordance with normal boarding protocols at the Army Personnel Centre in the coming months.

It is expected that the Army Trials Unit will be established in September 2024, and fully operational by January 2025. The Commanding Officer, in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, will be appointed in accordance with normal boarding protocols at the Army Personnel Centre in the coming months.

The table below shows the Army Full Time Trained Strength as at 1 April 2010 and Army Full Time Trade Trained Strength as at 1 January 2024.

Notes/Caveats:

1. Figures are published quarterly therefore figures have been supplied as at 01 January 2024 as these are the latest published stats in the public domain.
2. Full Time Trained Strength and Full Time Trade Trained comprises Trained UK Regular Forces, Trained Gurkhas and Full Time Reserve Service Personnel (FTRS).
3. Figures have been rounded to 10 for presentational purposes; numbers ending in "5" have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias.
4. Names and definitions have been changed between 2010 and 2024 but figures are comparable.

The Army routinely implements Financial Retention Incentives (FRIs). There are twelve live Financial Incentives, one of which has not yet been implemented, supporting seven different cap badges, capabilities or specialities.

The Army currently has two current ‘Golden Hellos’, both aimed at The Royal Logistic Corps capabilities, specifically chefs and petroleum operators.

The Army continuously monitors the effectiveness of these schemes. Effectiveness is largely measured on take up rates as well as the number of Service Personnel who rescind a Notice to Terminate. This information is captured in a Post Project Evaluation.

The Army Families Guide was introduced in 2010. Minor amendments have been made subsequently, with the last amendment in August 2023.

The Bereavement and Aftercare Support team in Army Headquarters are partway through a revision of this guide to update content, improve layout and complement rather than duplicate the Defence Purple Pack. Work is due to be completed in autumn 2024.

In response to the Government's policy announcement to implement a cap on Civil Service headcount, the Department is currently reviewing its future Civil Service workforce requirement aligned to this direction. Vacancies are being reviewed as part of workforce planning and prioritisation activity. Until this work is completed it is not possible to provide specific numbers of posts vacant/not being actively recruited.

In response to the Government's policy announcement to implement a cap on Civil Service headcount, the Department is currently reviewing its future Civil Service workforce requirement aligned to this direction. Vacancies are being reviewed as part of workforce planning and prioritisation activity. Until this work is completed it is not possible to provide specific numbers of posts vacant/not being actively recruited.

In response to the Government's policy announcement to implement a cap on Civil Service headcount, the Department is currently reviewing its future Civil Service workforce requirement aligned to this direction. Vacancies are being reviewed as part of workforce planning and prioritisation activity. Until this work is completed it is not possible to provide specific numbers of posts vacant/not being actively recruited.

The article was originally published in the British Medical Journal Military Health in July 2022. The purpose of the research was to consider the effectiveness of the sexual health brief Service personnel receive when they arrive in Kenya to determine whether the brief had any influence on soldiers’ approach to sexual health. Information about which units’ participants served with was not captured as part of the research.

As at 1 January 2024 there were 22,676 Army Regular Reservists with recall liability under Section 22 of the Reserve Forces Act (RFA) 96.

In addition, there are approximately 55,000 ex-Regular personnel as of March 2024 subject to recall under Section 68 of the RFA 96.

Notes/caveats:

1. The number of Army Regular Reservists with a recall liability can only be provided as at 1 January 2024 in line with Published National Statistics.
2. The Army Regular Reserve comprises ex-Regular Army personnel who retain a workforce obligation to be called up for service in times of need.
3. This figure includes the serving component which comprises ex-Regular personnel who have applied to return to Army service on a fixed term Reserve commitment.
4. The second figure comprises of personnel who have completed their military service and retain a liability to be recalled for service in the event of national danger, great emergency or an actual or suspected attack on the UK.
5. This figure is a single Service estimate based on management information which is not gathered for statistical purposes or subject to the same level of scrutiny as official statistics produced by Defence Statistics. The data as of March 2024 is the latest available.
6. The c55,000 includes ex-Regular Officers who retain a recall liability in perpetuity.

As at 1 January 2024 there were 22,676 Army Regular Reservists with recall liability under Section 22 of the Reserve Forces Act (RFA) 96.

In addition, there are approximately 55,000 ex-Regular personnel as of March 2024 subject to recall under Section 68 of the RFA 96.

Notes/caveats:

1. The number of Army Regular Reservists with a recall liability can only be provided as at 1 January 2024 in line with Published National Statistics.
2. The Army Regular Reserve comprises ex-Regular Army personnel who retain a workforce obligation to be called up for service in times of need.
3. This figure includes the serving component which comprises ex-Regular personnel who have applied to return to Army service on a fixed term Reserve commitment.
4. The second figure comprises of personnel who have completed their military service and retain a liability to be recalled for service in the event of national danger, great emergency or an actual or suspected attack on the UK.
5. This figure is a single Service estimate based on management information which is not gathered for statistical purposes or subject to the same level of scrutiny as official statistics produced by Defence Statistics. The data as of March 2024 is the latest available.
6. The c55,000 includes ex-Regular Officers who retain a recall liability in perpetuity.

The British Army has spent £2,569,393.89 on salaries for people employed in dedicated Diversity and Inclusion roles from 2019 to 2023. Individuals in the roles described are paid at a commensurate rate to their rank. In February, the Secretary of State for Defence ordered a root and branch review of ethnicity, diversity and inclusivity policies in Defence which is ongoing.

As at 1 October 2023, there are 73,515 personnel in the Full Time Trade Trained strength of the British Army, and 7,901 Civil Servants employed in the Army Top Level Budget. Of these, there are currently eight people employed in dedicated Diversity and Inclusion roles in the Army Headquarters. This reflects a reduction since 31 January 2024, at which point the Army employed 13 people in roles dedicated to Diversity and Inclusion. The five roles in Army formations have subsequently been disbanded.

The first table shows the Basic Training untrained intake for Reserve Officers and Other Ranks by financial year.

Table 1. Reserve FR20 Untrained Intake to Phase 1 by Officers / Other Ranks

Source: Analysis (Army)

The second table shows the Basic Training untrained intake actuals and targets for Reserve Other Ranks by financial year. There are no targets for Officers.

The actuals in the second column differ from the Other Ranks figures above; this is explained in Notes 4 and 5 below.

Table 2. Reserve Group A Other Ranks Untrained Intake to Phase 1 Actuals and Targets

Source: Analysis (Army) & Army Recruiting and Initial Training Command (ARITC)

For the Regular Army, I refer the Rt Hon. Member to the answer I gave on 8 January 2024 in answer to PQ7264: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-12-18/7264 which shows the Basic Training Starts (BTS) Targets for British Army Other Ranks by financial year.

Notes/Caveats:

1. Figures in Table 1 are for FR20 Phase 1 and Reserve Army ‘Group A’ Intake only.

2. The FR20 population consists of ‘Group A’ Army Reserves, some Sponsored Reserves and those personnel serving on FTRS contracts who were previously Army Reservists.

3. ‘Group A’ includes Volunteer Reserves, Mobilised Volunteer Reserves, High Readiness Reserves and OTC support & training staff and Officers under training.

4. Figures supplied in Table 1 are for the FR20 population and will match Accredited Official Statistics as supplied in the Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics Report from 2017/18 onwards. Figures are however for Phase 1 Intake only and may not match figures before this period.

5. Figures in Table 2 are for Reserve ‘Group A’ Other Ranks Phase 1 Intake and include movement between populations in FR20 i.e. Group E to Group A movements etc.

6. Army Reserve ‘Group E’ was introduced during November 2020. ‘Group E’ were previously included in ‘Group A’ and subsequently removed. Intake figures in Table 1 for Financial Year 2020/21 onwards are not directly comparable to previous Financial Years.

7. Figures include Untrained Intake from other Army populations and from other Services.

8. Figures have been rounded to 10 for presentational purposes; numbers ending in "5" have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias.

9. Totals and sub-totals have been rounded separately and so may not appear to be the sum of their parts.

The table shows the cost of the Army’s recruitment advertising costs by financial year.

Please note the following notes/caveats:

1. These figures are single Service estimates based on management information which is not gathered for statistical purposes or subject to the same level of scrutiny as official statistics produced by Defence Statistics.
2. The data for financial year 2018/2019 represents costs from November 2018 to March 2019.
3. The breakdown prior to November 2018 is not held. This data would need to be produced by an external contractor who no longer provides this service for the Army.
4. Spend on Facebook advertising from March – May 2023 will be incorporated in the 23/24 financial year, as this is the period for which the services were procured.
5. Spending on Instagram is incorporated in Facebook figures, as both fall under the umbrella of Meta.
6. Recruiting Group do not advertise on TikTok.
7. For the purposes of this answer, ‘above the line’ is taken to include Display, Out of Home, Radio, Paid Search and TV.

The information requested is provided in the following table.

Army Apprenticeship Achievements since 2019.

Notes/caveats:

1. These figures are single Service estimates based on management information which is not gathered for statistical purposes or subject to the same level of scrutiny as official statistics produced by Defence Statistics.
2. Data has been provided by full Contract Year which runs from 1 August to 31 July.
3. Standards are occupation-focussed, and Frameworks are qualification-focused.