Tackling fraud requires a unified and co-ordinated response from government, law enforcement and the private sector. The Government is working with industry, including the banking and tech sectors to ensure that victims are protected from these crimes in the first place and are not left out of pocket due to Authorised Push Payment (APP) frauds.

Since 2016, the Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) and the payments industry have worked together to both prevent payments fraud, and to develop better mechanisms for reimbursing victims of APP fraud. This has included introducing the voluntary Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) Code in 2019. Under the Code, signatory payment service providers voluntarily reimburse APP victims. The government recognised and welcomed these developments. However, reimbursement to victims of APP scams remains inconsistent. In the Queens Speech, government announced its intention to enable PSR regulatory action by amending Regulation 90 of the Payment Services Regulations, to clarify that the PSR may use its existing regulatory powers to require mandatory reimbursement in cases of APP scams in designated payment systems.

Data on the number of offences by location is not currently recorded by fraud type. However, UK Finance publish figures on the number of incidents of APP fraud for the UK each year. In 2020 UK Finance recorded 149,946 incidents of APP fraud (up 22% on 2019). Currently data is not held for the number of victims this relates to, and there may be victims who are targeted more than once. Additionally, please note UK Finance figures are for the UK and include personal and non-personal account reports.

The Home Office has not provided guidance to the National Police Chiefs Council on reducing authorised push payment fraud. Reducing this kind of fraud is a complex issue, which involves a number of different sectors to work together. That is why, the Home Office relaunched the Joint Fraud Taskforce in Oct 2021. The Joint Fraud Taskforce is a partnership between the private sector, Government and law enforcement to tackle fraud collectively and to focus on issues that have been considered too difficult for a single organisation to manage alone and to drive action to design out Fraud.

Tackling fraud requires a unified and co-ordinated response from government, law enforcement and the private sector. The Government is working with industry, including the banking and tech sectors to ensure that victims are protected from these crimes in the first place and are not left out of pocket due to Authorised Push Payment (APP) frauds.

Since 2016, the Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) and the payments industry have worked together to both prevent payments fraud, and to develop better mechanisms for reimbursing victims of APP fraud. This has included introducing the voluntary Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) Code in 2019. Under the Code, signatory payment service providers voluntarily reimburse APP victims. The government recognised and welcomed these developments. However, reimbursement to victims of APP scams remains inconsistent. In the Queens Speech, government announced its intention to enable PSR regulatory action by amending Regulation 90 of the Payment Services Regulations, to clarify that the PSR may use its existing regulatory powers to require mandatory reimbursement in cases of APP scams in designated payment systems.

Data on the number of offences by location is not currently recorded by fraud type. However, UK Finance publish figures on the number of incidents of APP fraud for the UK each year. In 2020 UK Finance recorded 149,946 incidents of APP fraud (up 22% on 2019). Currently data is not held for the number of victims this relates to, and there may be victims who are targeted more than once. Additionally, please note UK Finance figures are for the UK and include personal and non-personal account reports.

The Home Office has not provided guidance to the National Police Chiefs Council on reducing authorised push payment fraud. Reducing this kind of fraud is a complex issue, which involves a number of different sectors to work together. That is why, the Home Office relaunched the Joint Fraud Taskforce in Oct 2021. The Joint Fraud Taskforce is a partnership between the private sector, Government and law enforcement to tackle fraud collectively and to focus on issues that have been considered too difficult for a single organisation to manage alone and to drive action to design out Fraud.

Tackling fraud requires a unified and co-ordinated response from government, law enforcement and the private sector. The Government is working with industry, including the banking and tech sectors to ensure that victims are protected from these crimes in the first place and are not left out of pocket due to Authorised Push Payment (APP) frauds.

Since 2016, the Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) and the payments industry have worked together to both prevent payments fraud, and to develop better mechanisms for reimbursing victims of APP fraud. This has included introducing the voluntary Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) Code in 2019. Under the Code, signatory payment service providers voluntarily reimburse APP victims. The government recognised and welcomed these developments. However, reimbursement to victims of APP scams remains inconsistent. In the Queens Speech, government announced its intention to enable PSR regulatory action by amending Regulation 90 of the Payment Services Regulations, to clarify that the PSR may use its existing regulatory powers to require mandatory reimbursement in cases of APP scams in designated payment systems.

Data on the number of offences by location is not currently recorded by fraud type. However, UK Finance publish figures on the number of incidents of APP fraud for the UK each year. In 2020 UK Finance recorded 149,946 incidents of APP fraud (up 22% on 2019). Currently data is not held for the number of victims this relates to, and there may be victims who are targeted more than once. Additionally, please note UK Finance figures are for the UK and include personal and non-personal account reports.

The Home Office has not provided guidance to the National Police Chiefs Council on reducing authorised push payment fraud. Reducing this kind of fraud is a complex issue, which involves a number of different sectors to work together. That is why, the Home Office relaunched the Joint Fraud Taskforce in Oct 2021. The Joint Fraud Taskforce is a partnership between the private sector, Government and law enforcement to tackle fraud collectively and to focus on issues that have been considered too difficult for a single organisation to manage alone and to drive action to design out Fraud.

The detail of discussions with Cabinet peers are held in confidence. I would, however, like to reassure you that tackling economic crime is a priority for me, and the Home Secretary and I continue to work closely across Government, and with industry, including via our Economic Crime Strategic Board, to address the harm caused by economic crime to the UK.

In partnership with Treasury colleagues, we are working with the public and private sectors to develop the second Economic Crime Plan. This will set out our collective response for the future to reduce the scale of economic crime. We are also developing an ambitious 10 Year Fraud Strategy. We intend to publish these later this year.

It has been the policy of successive Governments neither to confirm nor deny matters relating to the activities of the security and intelligence services.

The UK holds a watchlist of adverse information and intelligence drawn from a variety of sources, including the police. The system is used by Home Office staff for the purposes of national security and the detection and prevention of crime.

The National Security Council is a committee of the Cabinet. It is a long-established precedent that information about the discussions that have taken place in Cabinet and its Committees, and how often they have met, is not normally shared publicly.

The Government does not routinely comment on intelligence matters, including whether an organisation is under consideration for proscription.

The Government keeps the list of proscribed organisations under review.

The Government keeps under review the views promoted and activities undertaken by the Muslim Brother-hood’s associates in the UK in accordance with the five commitments included in the former Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament.

The Government will consider any new evidence on the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities against the UK’s legal thresholds, including whether they meet the test for proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Fraud is a national threat and often cases can be complex and sophisticated. It is therefore paramount our policing colleagues have what they need to keep pace with criminals and encourage innovation within industry. That is why, through the Spending Review 21 settlement and the Economic Crime Levy an overall package over the next three years of circa £400 million is being used to tackle economic crime, including fraud.

This funding will be used to replace and upgrade Action Fraud with a new national Fraud and Cyber Reporting and Analysis Service which will gather better analysis to improve the number, quality and timeliness of information packages given to police and expand fraud investigation teams across all Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) and increase investigative capacity in the City of London Police (CoLP). This funding will also support the National Crime Agency, (NCA) to increase their capabilities on fraud.

The pilot of a national cyber crime force focused on fraud, based in the NCA was set out in the 2021 Statement of Progress on the Economic Crime Plan. The NCA’s pilot has delivered new tasking, intelligence and strategic communications capabilities in the NCA. This new national cyber crime force focused on fraud will be fully established by 2025.

Later this year, we will publish a new strategy to address the threat of fraud. This will further set out how we will work with law enforcement to tackle fraud and bring offenders to justice.

The Government, working with the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), continues to ensure that all stakeholders have access to the advice, training and guidance to ensure they understand terrorist threats and measures which can be taken to protect their staff and the public.

To further support delivery across the public and private sector and sharing of CT content, the Home Office has collaborated with NaCTSO and Pool Reinsurance to develop a new interactive online platform; ProtectUK. The platform was released at Security & Policing 2022 and is gathering feedback ahead of a more formal, public launch later this year.

Whilst our engagement and advice has done much to improve security and preparedness measures at public places, this is undertaken on a voluntary basis. This Government announced our intention to introduce a ‘Protect Duty’ in legislation. The new duty will seek to improve the safety and security at public venues through the application of proportionate security measures.

It is our long-standing policy not to provide detailed information on matters of protective security. To do so could compromise the integrity of those arrangements and affect the security of the individuals concerned.

Under the Economic Crime Plan, Government is investigating policy options for unlocking suspected criminal funds held within suspended accounts to tackle economic crime. However, the requested information is not held by Government.

The Government does not routinely comment on intelligence matters, including whether an organisation is under consideration for proscription.

The Government keeps the list of proscribed organisations under review.

The Government recognises that fraudsters will use any means they can to trick people into handing over their hard-earned money. We recognise these crimes can have significant and devastating impacts on people’s lives, particularly the most vulnerable in society.

We have sanctioned the banning of cold calls from personal injury firms and pension providers, unless the consumer has explicitly agreed to be contacted and introduced director liability for companies in relation to nuisance calls.

Through the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) we have imposed strict obligations on organisations that make direct marketing calls, live or automated, to individuals in the UK. We would advise people to register with the free Telephone Preference Service (TPS) which is a “do not call” register for landlines and mobile numbers. TPS reduces the number of unwanted sales and marketing calls you receive. To register call 0345 070 0707 or visit https://www.tpsonline.org.uk/.

We have supported the National Trading Standards Scams Team to roll out call blocking devices to vulnerable people. DCMS have provided over £1 million in the last three years to National Trading Standards for distribution of call blocking devices to vulnerable people. This funding has helped to protect some of the most vulnerable in society from nuisance calls and scams.

Tackling fraud requires a unified and co-ordinated response from government, law enforcement and the private sector to better protect the public and businesses from fraud, reduce the impact of fraud on victims, and increase the disruption and prosecution of fraudsters which is why, later this year, we will publish a new strategy to address the threat of fraud.

Resource and staffing requirements at every port are continually reviewed by Border Force who work closely with port operators to ensure resources are deployed flexibly as and when they are required.

Performance against our passenger wait time SLA can be found in Border Force Transparency data available at:

Border Force transparency data: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/border-force-transparency-data-q4-2021

It was agreed across government that the criteria and eligibility for the Platinum Jubilee Medal would remain the same as for the Diamond Jubilee Medal, which Border Force does not fall under.

A Long Service and Good Conduct Medal approved by HM The Queen will be launched this year for both Border Force and Immigration Enforcement, to recognise the valuable contribution made by our staff.

There are a wide range of reasons that police may stop individuals travelling through ports. Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, Counter-Terrorism Police officers can stop and examine members of the public travelling through ports to determine their involvement in terrorist activity. The Home Office does not routinely comment on individual cases, and decisions on who to examine under Schedule 7 are made independently of government by the police.

I would refer the Honourable Member to the first volume of the Chair’s findings of the Manchester Arena Inquiry, which was published in June 2021. Volumes 2 and 3 of the findings are scheduled for publication later in 2022, and further information can be found on the Inquiry’s website: manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk

A summary of the relevant report was provided to the Manchester Arena Inquiry. This followed a thorough process overseen by the Inquiry Chair and his legal team as to what content could be disclosed without damaging national security.

Regrettably disclosing the report would cause damage to national security.

The Manchester Arena Inquiry is a statutory independent Inquiry and decisions as to how to deliver its terms of reference are a matter for the Chair.

The Inquiry heard evidence on what steps had been taken to ensure Ismail Abedi appeared at the Inquiry on 21 October. The transcript for the hearing is published in full: https://files.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk/live/uploads/2021/10/21201337/MAI-Day-165_Redacted.pdf

Greater Manchester Police provided evidence to the Inquiry on Ismail Abedi’s departure from the UK which is published on the Manchester Arena Inquiry website: https://files.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk/live/uploads/2021/12/21144111/INQ042319.pdf

In line with long-standing Home Office policy, it would not be appropriate to comment on individual cases.

The first volume of the Chair’s findings of the Manchester Arena Inquiry was published in June 2021, with volumes 2 and 3 scheduled for publication later in 2022. Further information can be found on the Inquiry’s website: manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk