Search Results

1-20 of 32 results for subject:"Health hazards"

Show detailed: On Off

Results: 10 20 50 100

Sort by: Newest first Oldest first

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many individuals (a) in or formerly with the armed forces and (b) in Southern Iraq have been tested specifically for evidence of depleted uranium contamination.

Asked by

Helen Jackson (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Tabled on

5 July 1999

For answer on

19 July 1999

Answered on

19 July 1999

Helen Jackson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many individuals (a) in or formerly with the armed forces and (b) in Southern Iraq have been tested specifically for evidence of depleted uranium contamination. [90363] Mr. Doug Henderson: There is no central record of any health tests conducted for those still serving or for those who have left the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence is aware of the suggestion that exposure to depleted uranium (DU) is a cause of ill-health among some veterans of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. Any Gulf veteran who is concerned that their health has been adversely affected by service during that conflict is entitled to seek a referral to the Ministry of Defence's Gulf Veterans' Medical Assessment Programme (MAP) for a full medical assessment. During assessment, the patient receives a set of standard tests. If the examining physician considers it clinically appropriate for a patient to receive tests to detect DU, these would be arranged. Between one and five people so far examined by MAP physicians, have exhibited symptoms that, in the judgment of the examining physicians, have indicated a clinical requirement for testing to detect DU, and have been tested. However, a very small number of UK troops, who expressed concern that they might have inhaled DU dust during preparatory training in Saudi Arabia before the state of hostilities, were subjected to Whole Body Monitoring in February 1991. They showed no detectable contamination. The Ministry of Defence is also aware of reports of DU testing undertaken by Professor Sharma of the University of Waterloo, Ontario, and Dr. Durakovic of Georgetown University, Washington. Dr. Durakovic discussed their work in general terms with Ministry of Defence officials in February 1999, when he explained that they are carrying out a study into uranium levels among veterans of the Gulf conflict, in which it is understood a small number of UK Gulf veterans and Iraqi nationals are participating. Dr. Durakovic indicated that they plan to publish their findings, including details of the methodology they are using and the results obtained, later this year. Their work is not being undertaken at the request of the Ministry of Defence and any UK Gulf veterans who choose to participate do so on a voluntary basis. The healthcare of Iraqi nationals, including any testing for the presence of DU, is a matter for the Iraqi Government.

Date

19 July 1999

Reference

90363; 335 c421-2W;335 c423-4W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 16th June, Official Report, 333 c148-9W, if he will place in the Library the March 1999 paper produced by his Department's Gulf Veterans' Illness Unit in respect of testing for the presence of depleted uranium. Copies of...

Asked by

Andrew Mackinlay (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

24 June 1999

Reference

87834; 333 c453-4W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what epidemiologically valid trials have been conducted on service people who were exposed to depleted uranium debris in the Gulf War. - (Holding answer 15 June 1999).

Asked by

Paul Flynn (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Tabled on

9 June 1999

For answer on

16 June 1999

Answered on

16 June 1999

Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what epidemiologically valid trials have been conducted on service people who were exposed to depleted uranium debris in the Gulf War. [86951] Mr. Doug Henderson: [holding answer 15 June 1999]: The Ministry of Defence's portfolio of research programmes into Gulf veterans' illnesses matters currently comprises two major epidemiological studies looking at the health of UK Gulf veterans, a neuromuscular symptoms study, an independent review of research literature, and a programme to investigate possible interactions between the medical countermeasures which were used during the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. The Ministry of Defence is also supporting a further epidemiological study of UK Gulf veterans which is being funded by the United States Government. However, none of these programmes, epidemiological or otherwise, is specifically aimed at investigating the health effects of depleted uranium. Nevertheless, all three teams conducting epidemiological research are well aware that depleted uranium is one of many possible exposures in the Gulf which have been put forward as a potential cause of Gulf-related illnesses, and they have and will continue to, take this into account in their studies. Possible exposure to depleted uranium at the time of the Gulf conflict was included in the questionnaires which the teams have sent, or are sending, to random samples of Gulf veterans and control groups. One of the epidemiological studies--that being conducted by a team from King's College, London--published their initial results in the Lancet in January. Of the 30 different exposures reported by those veterans who completed the survey, depleted uranium was the fourth least frequently reported. The need for further research work is kept under regular review by the Ministry of Defence and the Medical Research Council (MRC) which advises the Government on its overall strategy for Gulf health issues. So far, however, the MRC has not recommended that the Ministry of Defence commission any specific depleted uranium related research. Gulf veterans who are concerned that their health has been adversely affected by service during the Gulf conflict, including by possible exposure to DU, are entitled to seek a referral to the Gulf veterans' Medical Assessment Programme (MAP) for a full medical assessment. During this assessment, veterans receive a standard set of tests and are asked by the examining MAP physician to provide detailed information about possible factors, including depleted uranium, to which they may have been exposed during the Gulf conflict. Any further tests which are considered clinically appropriate by the examining MAP physician, including those to detect the presence of depleted uranium, are also arranged.

Date

16 June 1999

Reference

333 c148-9W; 86951

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what scientific research was commissioned by his Department following the use of depleted-uranium weapons in Iraq in 1991 to assess (a) the short and (b) the long-term effects on people and the environment; and to whom the result of the research has...

Asked by

Valerie Davey (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Tabled on

31 March 1999

For answer on

13 April 1999

Answered on

13 April 1999

Valerie Davey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what scientific research was commissioned by his Department following the use of depleted uranium weapons in Iraq in 1991 to assess (a) the short and (b) the long-term effects on people and the environment; and to whom the result of the research has been made available. [79858] Mr. Doug Henderson: The Ministry of Defence has not commissioned any scientific research to investigate the health and environmental effects of using DU-based ammunition during the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. However, the potential hazards of DU are well understood and are well documented in the scientific literature. In 1993, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency's Radiation Protection Service (then the Defence Radiological Protection Service (DRPS)) published a summary report of its assessment of the potential hazards posed by DU. The report, copies of which have already been placed in the Library of the House, explained that there are two types of hazard posed by the use of DU: a radiation hazard, although DU is a low specific activity material (as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency); and a chemical toxicity hazard, which is similar to that posed by other heavy metals, such as lead. DU-based ammunition is currently fired by the MOD at two ranges in the UK--Kirkcudbright in southern Scotland and Eskmeals in Cumbria--for test and evaluation purposes. In December 1993, the MOD commissioned independent environmental consultants, W. S. Atkins, to conduct a detailed review of the environmental impact of this test-firing. The consultants' resulting report, a copy of which has already been placed in the Library of the House, was published in 1995. It concluded that the radiation doses to members of the public, and the associated risks from exposure to DU released into the environment were extremely low. These conclusions were, and continue to be, substantiated by comprehensive monitoring programmes at both sites. The Ministry of Defence is, of course, well aware of suggestions, particularly in the Press, that the use of DU-based ammunition during the Gulf conflict has caused an increase in ill-health, including deformities, cancers and birth defects, in Iraq (particularly around Basra, Az Zubayr and Um Qasr). However, we have not seen any peer-reviewed epidemiological research data which support these claims. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the illnesses of the types highlighted in Press articles are uniquely associated with exposure to DU. The Government would, of course, consider carefully any reliable medical or scientific data which may emerge concerning the incidence of ill-health in Iraq. The Ministry of Defence is also aware of the suggested link between exposure to DU and the illnesses being experienced by some Gulf veterans. However, this is only one of a number of factors which have been suggested as causes of Gulf veterans' illnesses and, pending further medical and scientific evidence, my Department is keeping an open mind on this issue. On 19 March, I published the detailed paper "Testing for the presence of depleted uranium in UK veterans of the Gulf conflict: The Current Position". The paper, copies of which have been placed in the Library of the House, describes the scenarios in which UK troops may have been exposed to DU in the Gulf and the possible health effects of such exposures.

Date

13 April 1999

Reference

79858; 329 c43-4W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what efforts Her Majesty's Government is making to obtain medicinal and scientific data about the effects of depleted uranium-based ammunition in Iraq. - (Holding answer 18 March 1999).

Asked by

Tam Dalyell (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

29 March 1999

Reference

77258; 328 c483-4W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many Gulf War veterans, medically tested as part of his Department's research programme, have shown signs of uranium-related illness; and if he will make a statement; how many Gulf War veterans have had a medical test since the research programme commenced;...

Asked by

Mike Hancock (Liberal Democrat)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

29 March 1999

Reference

328 c481-2W; 72940;72931

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what plans he has to review the hazards of exposure to depleted uranium. - Includes ref to 17 February 1998 at 586 c17-22WA and 13 May 1998 at 312 c128-9W and Report on Depleted Uranium in Library.

Asked by

Gerry Steinberg (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

19 March 1999

Reference

74714; 327 c865W;327 c863W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what is the basis for the statement of 15th February by Mr Alan Casson of his Department's Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit that it is highly unlikely that local populations would have been exposed to any significant amount of respirable dust. - Includes...

Asked by

Tam Dalyell (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Tabled on

15 March 1999

For answer on

19 March 1999

Answered on

19 March 1999

Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the basis for the statement of 15 February by Mr. Alan Casson of his Department's Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit that it is highly unlikely that local populations would have been exposed to any significant amount of respirable dust. [77257] Mr. Doug Henderson: [holding answer 18 March 1999]: I believe that the statement to which the hon. Member refers was made in a letter dated 15 February from Mr. Alan Casson, an official in my Department's Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit, to a member of the public. The basis for that statement was fully explained in that letter, the text of which is repeated in its entirety as follows: Letter from Mr. Alan Casson, Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit to a member of the public dated 15 February 1999: Thank you for your letter of 19 October to the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Robertson, which enclosed a copy of an article from the Independent concerning ill-health in southern Iraq and an alleged link to the use of depleted uranium (DU) based ammunition by UK and US forces during the 1990/91 Gulf. I have been asked to reply and apologise for not doing so sooner. Both US and UK forces did indeed use DU-based ammunition during the Gulf War. UK forces used a new 120mm tank round which contained a solid DU penetrator core with a protective (non-DU) coating in its Challenger 1 tanks. US forces used 20mm, 25mm, 30mm, 105mm and 120mm ammunition rounds in its tanks, aircraft and ships. The MOD's current assessment is that UK tanks fired fewer than one hundred 120mm rounds against Iraq's military forces during hostilities (which equates to less than 1 metric tonne of DU), although additional rounds were fired during earlier work-up training to establish the round's Mean Point of Impact (MPI). In a paper published in August last year, the US Government reported that US forces in the Gulf had fired ammunition rounds containing some 290 metric tonnes of DU. It might be helpful if I explained the properties of DU and how the metal used in the manufacture of UK DU-based ammunition is produced. Uranium exists in three forms, known as isotopes. These isotopes are uranium-238, uranium-235 and uranium-234 and, in naturally occurring uranium, are found in the ratio 99.3% {238}U:0.7% {235}U:0.006% {234}U. Uranium in an `enriched' form is used in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. The term enriched is used because the concentration of {234}U has been artificially enhanced from that found in naturally occurring uranium. The by-product of this enrichment process is the production of DU, which involved the removal of virtually all {234}U and a reduction of the proportion of {235}U to a low level. Typically, by weight, DU contains 99.7% {238}U, 0.2% {235}U and 0.00007% {234}U. It might also be helpful if I explained the potential health hazards posed by the use of DU. Depleted uranium is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a Low Specific Activity material; this means that its level of radioactivity is considerably lower than that of most man-made radionuclides such as plutonium and americium. DU-based ammunition rounds can produce a small amount of radioactive and toxic particulate material when they impact with a hard surface, which could present a health risk if inhaled or ingested. However, this material is fairly rapidly diluted and dispersed into the environment by the weather, to the point where it becomes difficult to detect, usually within a few hundred metres of impact, even with the most sophisticated radiation monitoring equipment. Thus, it is unlikely that anyone other than those in an armoured vehicle hit by a DU projectile or those spending prolonged periods within a few tens of metres of the point at which a DU-based round had impacted with a hard target would be exposed to large enough quantities of the material for their health to be a risk. Solid DU fragments present only a localised external radiation hazard to anyone handling them as only a very small fraction of the radiation emitted is able to penetrate the (dead) outer layer of the skin and because these fragments are too large to be inhaled or ingested. It would be necessary for a DU fragment to be in direct contact with the skin for tens of hours before any statutory UK dose limit for members of the public would be exceeded and even this would not give rise to any observable medical effects or a significant increase in the long term cancer risk. Another potential health hazard from DU is posed by its level of chemical toxicity, which is similar to that of other heavy metals such as lead. This could give risk to health problems if soluble DU were to be ingested or inhaled but this is very unlikely as the DU residues found on the battlefield are generally in the form of solid DU fragments or relatively insoluble oxides. Should any of these insoluble oxides be ingested, most would pass straight through the body and the risk of any health effects arising from this exposure route is therefore negligible. The inhalation of insoluble oxides gives rise to effects which result from the radioactive rather than toxic properties of DU. This is because insoluble particles are retained in the lung for prolonged periods and are excreted very slowly and at concentrations unlikely to affect the kidneys which are the organ at most risk from any toxic effects. The Independent article referred to a paper written by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in April 1991 entitled "Kuwait--Depleted Uranium Contamination", which was produced for Royal Ordnance plc (rather than the Ministry of Defence) on a commercial basis. (A copy of this paper is attached for your information.) The paper calculated 500,000 potential deaths if 50 tonnes of DU dust was left in the area. However, a number of assumptions made in this paper are very far from realistic. Indeed, the paper itself makes clear that it is not a rigorous scientific analysis of the actual situation, but a theoretical appraisal of the possible worst-case effects of firing DU-based ammunition in Kuwait. In particular, the paper assumes that all the DU fired in Kuwait was converted into respirable dust and that all of this dust was inhaled by a very large number of people. However, as I have already explained above, a DU penetrator core needs to hit a very hard target to cause the burning which produces radioactive and toxic dust. In practice, this only occurs when a DU penetrator hits extremely hard armour such as is found on only the most modern Main Battle Tanks. Such burning does not occur if the penetrator hits other, softer, types of armoured vehicles or if it misses its target and hits the ground. Of the DU-based rounds fired in Kuwait and Iraq, only a relatively small percentage would have hit a target hard enough to cause the DU penetrator to burn. Furthermore, our assessment, based on a large number of trials carried out in the UK and US, is that only about 20% of the DU in a DU-based round that has hit such a target is converted into respirable dust. Since the DU-based rounds were fired in the desert, many kilometres from the nearest village, it is highly unlikely that the local population would have been exposed to any significant amount of respirable dust. The Government does not have any information concerning the levels of DU currently present in the Gulf and cannot, therefore, comment on this matter. However, the UK tanks which were equipped with DU-based rounds during the Gulf conflict did not operate in the areas in southern Iraq in which it has been suggested that there is an elevated level of ill-health compared to that in other areas in Iraq (see next paragraph). After crossing the Saudi Arabian/Iraqi border north of Hafr al Batin, these tanks, which were part of 1 (UK) Armoured Division, turned east, entered Kuwait and pushed towards Kuwait City. We assess that 1 (UK) Armoured Division came no closer than about 75 kilometres from Az Zubayr and about 40 kilometres from Um Qasr. The maximum range of a DU-based round fired from UK tanks is less than 15 kilometres. The article attached to your letter and a number of other articles by Robert Fisk have suggested that the use of DU-based ammunition during the Gulf War is affecting the health of some of the Iraqi population. The Government is aware that there have been suggestions, particularly in the Independent, that the use of DU-based ammunition during the Gulf conflict has caused an increase in ill-health, including deformities, cancers and birth defects, in southern Iraq (particularly around Basra, Az Zubayr and Um Qasr). However, the Government has not seen any peer-reviewed epidemiological research data on this population to support these claims and it would, therefore, be premature to comment on this matter. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the illnesses of the types highlighted in the article attached to your letter (or in other Independent articles) are uniquely associated with exposure to DU. The Government would, of course, consider carefully any medical or scientific data which was presented on this subject. Finally, it might be helpful if I set out the role that the Government has taken to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime. Since 1991, the UK has donated around £100 million bilaterally and via the European Union for use in projects throughout Iraq (many of which have specifically targeted the needs of children and widow-headed families), making the UK one of the largest donors. The UK also co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 986 which set up the original `oil-for-food' programme under which Iraq can sell oil to fund the purchase of humanitarian supplies. More recently, we drafted Resolutions improving and expanding the programme so that Iraq can sell US$5.3 billion of oil every 6 months (more than double the original amount). I hope this is helpful. A copy of the paper by the UK Atomic Energy Authority, which is mentioned in the letter, has already been placed in the Library of the House.

Date

19 March 1999

Reference

77257; 327 c868-70W;327 c866-8W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place in the Library a copy of the response of Mr Alan Casson of the Gulf Veterans Illness Unit to the letter of Mr Bill Griffin of Templeuisce, Glanmire, (reference D/GVIV/a/I) of 23rd February, regarding depleted uranium. - (Holding...

Asked by

Tam Dalyell (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

19 March 1999

Reference

327 c871W;327 c869W; 77326

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

Statement on what is the outcome of his review of the possible employment of women in submarines and in mine clearance diving.

Asked by

Rosemary McKenna (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Tabled on

23 February 1999

For answer on

24 February 1999

Answered on

24 February 1999

Mrs. McKenna: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the outcome of his review of the possible employment of women in submarines and in mine clearance diving. [73578] Mr. Doug Henderson: We are committed to equality of opportunity in the Armed Forces. In the course of the Strategic Defence we examined the opportunities for maximising opportunity for women in each of the Services provided that this would not damage combat effectiveness. The results of this work were set out in the report on the Strategic Defence Review (Cmd 2999), in which we also announced our intention to review the exclusion of women from service in submarines and Royal Navy mine clearance. We have now completed our review of these matters and concluded that we should maintain our policy of excluding women from service in submarines and mine clearance diving for medical reasons. In reaching this conclusion I considered all the evidence very carefully and looked hard for options which might enable us to open service in submarines to women despite the medical risks involved. I was not able, however, to put to one side the MOD's statutory duty of care under the Health and Safety at Work Act, etc. 1974. All RN submarines currently in service may remain submerged for up to 90 days for operational reasons. In the course of such deployments, contaminants build up in the internal atmosphere. Although there is careful control of the materials allowed aboard and atmospheric filtration, the build up of contaminants such as carbon dioxide in this closed environment cannot be prevented. Such an atmosphere is not harmful to adults, but medical studies by the Institute of Naval Medicine show that for some contaminants the levels exceed those considered safe to the foetus of a pregnant woman, and therefore also place the woman's health at risk. In other cases there is insufficient data available to recommend with confidence maximum exposure limits which would prevent harm to the foetus and the woman. A woman, in at least the first days after conception, may not be aware that she is pregnant. If she were serving in a submarine there is, therefore, the small possibility that she might unknowingly expose here unborn child to levels on contamination above those considered safe. Even if some women were prepared to accept the risks and volunteer to serve in submarines the MOD could not compromise its duty of care by allowing them to do so. In the specialised area of mine clearance diving, (where there are far fewer posts involved), there are also substantial medical risks to an unborn child and, therefore, the mother, caused in this case by the very high pressures to which these divers are subjected. As far as women who are not pregnant are concerned, the medical risks are less well understood, but there may be a risk to a woman during menstruation. I have accepted the medical advice that women should, therefore, be excluded from working as Mine Clearance Divers at least until more definitive medical advice is available. The Government and the Armed Forces are determined that the widest possible employment opportunities should be available to women in the Armed Forces. The position on service in submarines and mine diving clearance will, therefore, be kept under review.

Date

24 February 1999

Reference

326 c300-1W; 73578

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what progress has been made on the Gulf Veterans Medical Assessment Programme; and if he will make a statement. - Includes ref to a paper describing the clinical findings from the first 1,000 patients examined at the MAP, in Library.

Asked by

Mark Todd (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

24 February 1999

Reference

67462; 326 c294W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

Statement on the independent review conducted by Professor Brian Spratt of the South Coast biological defence trials. - Inc ref to a copy of Professor Spratt's full report in Library.

Asked by

Ivor Caplin (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

9 February 1999

Reference

70568; 325 c134W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what organophosphate lubricants are used in the engines of military (a) fixed winged aircraft and (b) helicopters; and if he will make a statement on possible health hazards for air crews. - (Holding answer 19 January 1999).

Asked by

Lord Tyler (Liberal Democrat)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

4 February 1999

Reference

66599; 324 c737W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if research on exposure of military personnel to organophosphates in the Gulf War has been completed; and whether it will be published.

Asked by

Mark Todd (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Tabled on

20 January 1999

For answer on

1 February 1999

Answered on

1 February 1999

Mr. Todd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if research on exposure of military personnel to organophosphates in the Gulf War has been completed; and whether it will be published. [67477] Mr. Doug Henderson: When it became apparent that organophosphate (OP) pesticides had been more widely used by UK forces during the Gulf conflict than had previously been thought, the Ministry of Defence carried out an urgent investigation into the circumstances in which they had been used. The investigation team's report was published on 10 December 1996. Copies of this report were placed in the Library of the House. Broadly, the team found that OP pesticides were, in the main, used properly by personnel who are trained in the safe use of such products, including the wearing of Personal Protective Equipment. The Ministry of Defence is currently funding a programme of research into different aspects of Gulf veterans' illnesses. None of these studies is specifically aimed at investigating a possible relationship between exposure to OP pesticides and such illnesses. Research to investigate the effects of low level exposure to OP pesticides in the context of the health concerns of farm workers, funded jointly by the Department of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Health and Safety Executive, is well under way at the Institute of Occupational Medicine in Edinburgh. This will be an important step towards understanding the possible effects of potential exposures during the Gulf conflict. Final data analysis is currently taking place and the study as a whole is expected to be completed in April this year. The study team's report is expected later in the Summer. The MAFF is also currently funding a study at the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) at Porton Down to determine whether a low dose of the OP diazinon will give rise to adverse long term effects.

Date

1 February 1999

Reference

67477; 324 c446-7W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what research has been conducted into Aspartame as a possible cause of Gulf War Syndrome; what evidence he has assessed of a possible link between Aspartame and Gulf War Syndrome.

Asked by

Paul Stinchcombe (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

1 February 1999

Reference

324 c446W; 66676;66675

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

Answered by

Doug Henderson (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Oral answers to questions

Date

25 January 1999

Reference

324 c7

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what research he has (a) commissioned and (b) evaluated concerning the health effects on service personnel of depleted uranium shells used in the Gulf War.

Asked by

Mike Hancock (Liberal Democrat)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

25 January 1999

Reference

324 c1W; 64225

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What measures he is taking to investigate the cause of health problems amongst Gulf War veterans.

Asked by

Chris Pond (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Oral questions - Lead

Status

Answered

Date

25 January 1999

Reference

324 c7; 65525

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what conclusions his Department has drawn from the consequences of the explosion at Bhopal as regards the results of bombing chemical and biological weapons facilities.

Asked by

Tam Dalyell (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

16 December 1998

Reference

62662; 322 c530W

House

House of Commons

Ministry of Defence

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what plans he has to involve the National Regional Poison Centres in the medical assessments of veterans of the Gulf War and their families. - (Holding answer 9 December 1998).

Asked by

Lord Clark of Windermere (Labour)

Answering body

Ministry of Defence

Type

Written questions

Status

Answered

Date

14 December 1998

Reference

62957; 322 c326W

House

House of Commons

Librarians' tools

Type

House

Session

Year

Department

Member

Primary member

Answering member

Legislative stage

Legislation

Subject

Publisher