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Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

My Lords, it will come as no surprise to the Minister to know that we on these Benches continue to support strong, targeted sanctions in response to Russia’s illegal and brutal invasion of Ukraine. Since 2022, the UK, alongside our allies, has imposed an unprecedented range of sanctions to weaken Russia’s war machine. There are clearly

some concerns; we would like to see further action taken, with regard to enforcement and the shadow fleet, et cetera—I agree with the previous speaker.

Despite these efforts, Russia has continued its aggression, often working through third countries and illicit networks to bypass existing sanctions. The persistence of these efforts underlines the importance of closing loopholes, keeping sanctions up to date and aligning with our international partners.

As the Minister set out, these provisions aim to tighten and expand the existing sanctions framework. One key element is the expansion of export-related goods, including chemicals, plastics, metals, machinery and electronics. It is clear that these have potential military applications, and we support their inclusion. Notably, even items such as video game controllers are now being restricted, due to their reported use in piloting drones. I suspect Russia probably will not have difficulty in obtaining those from other sources, but nevertheless it is important to make the effort. Can the Minister clarify how these additions were identified? How often is the department reviewing product categories to ensure that sanctions keep pace with technological adaptation?

The instrument also brings in new restrictions on the transfer of software and technology, not only physically, but through intangible means such as downloads and cloud access. This is an important evolution of the regime, particularly as cloud-based platforms become more central to global business and infrastructure. However, it does again prompt the question of how we are going to enforce such sanctions when there is no physical movement of goods. Does the Minister have confidence that our enforcement bodies have the technical capacity to monitor compliance with these intangible software restrictions? Are businesses being given clear guidance on what is now prohibited?

On import bans, we note the Government’s decision to sanction synthetic diamonds processed in third countries, building on the ban already in place for natural stones. While I suspect that Russia is not a major producer of synthetic diamonds, this appears aimed at closing a circumvention route. What evidence does the Government have that synthetic diamonds are being used to sidestep the existing sanctions on natural stones? How are we working with allies to enforce traceability and verification?

We also note the inclusion of helium and helium-3 in the list of banned imports. This, too, is framed as a pre-emptive step, anticipating the growth of helium as a potential revenue stream for Russia in future. Will the Minister please confirm whether there is current evidence of Russia scaling up helium exports, or is this purely a precautionary measure?

There are also some important technical clarifications in the SI, including the correction of omitted offences and clearer enforcement responsibilities across government departments. Although these may seem fairly minor, such details are vital to effective enforcement. Will the Minister please confirm whether further regulatory gaps are under review, particularly given the pace at which circumvention technology is evolving?

With those few questions, we support the intent behind these measures. They reflect an ongoing commitment to tightening the UK’s sanctions regime and maintaining pressure on the Russian Government. But sanctions can be only as effective as the enforcement and adaptation measures. As Russia continues to develop complex workarounds—from third-country trade to its unregulated shadow fleet—we, the sanctioning countries, have to be equally agile. That includes reviewing measures regularly, ensuring that departments have the capacity to act and strengthening international co-operation. In that spirit, will the Minister please say more about how the Government are assessing the real-world impact of sanctions—not just in terms of goods restricted but in terms of their broader economic and strategic effect on Russia’s capacity to wage war? We believe that these regulations are a step in the right direction, but they must be part of a broader, joined-up and rigorously enforced sanctions strategy.