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Scotland: Independence

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, once again. We have not done it for a few years since he departed, so I take great pleasure in following him—and I agree with a great deal of what he had to say.

This is a debate about the effects of the Scottish referendum result on the rest of the United Kingdom. I therefore hope that it is not totally inappropriate that someone who is Welsh should now comment. I declare an interest at the outset: I am as passionate about Wales is Alex Salmond is about Scotland. I have equal respect for the history, traditions and culture of Wales as he probably does for those of Scotland. Additionally, I have to recognise that Wales has a distinction that Scotland lacks; namely, a working, living language. I also believe firmly and deeply that Wales is a nation. It is not a glorified county council: nor is it really a geographical region. Its past and the way in which it has jealously guarded its culture and way of life give it a national character.

Having said that, I am none the less convinced that the future of Wales lies within the United Kingdom and not outside it. The advantages of Welsh association within the UK are apparent. Over the years it has brought Wales relative prosperity and a standard of living which I do not think we could conceivably have achieved had we been an independent country of merely some 3 million people. The United Kingdom has given us a degree of stability and economic protection that would be jeopardised in the event of independence.

It is not for me, as a Welshman, to enter into the details of the debate on the Scottish campaign. I shall say only this: the note produced by the Library of the House of Lords should perhaps be compulsory reading for all the combatants in this debate. It is comprehensive and accurate and, as far as I can judge, it takes a neutral view. It clearly demonstrates—this has emerged in the course of the debate so far—the extraordinary complexity of the process of Scottish independence. The number of institutions that would have to be amended, changed or removed and the amount of institution building that would have to take place inside Scotland if it were to come out of the United Kingdom mean that it would be an extraordinarily complex and a very detailed and daunting prospect.

As for the benefits that the Scottish National Party claims will inevitably flow from independence, the claims are excessively optimistic, to put it mildly. They seem to be based on Panglossian view that everybody else is going to be nice to an emerging Scotland. I do not think that that is necessarily true for a moment. I do not think it is true of the rest of the United Kingdom that we will be particularly nice to an emerging Scotland that has just rejected us. As far as the European Union is concerned, it does not follow that it would welcome Scotland in with open arms. I can think of a

number of countries that almost certainly would not welcome Scotland in with open arms. There would have to be a fresh application to join, there would have to be detailed negotiations and there would have to be a transitional period before Scotland could become a full member. During that period, a lot of the benefits that at present come from the EU to Scotland would presumably cease—because they go to the United Kingdom, not to Scotland. I suspect that the agricultural subsidy that goes from Brussels to Scottish farmers would have to cease during that period of association. I cannot believe that is very much in the interests of Scotland.

Nor does the economic arithmetic seem to fit. Trying to look at it as objectively as I can, the Scottish case seems to be based on a series of economic assumptions, almost all of which are on a best-case basis rather than a worst-case basis. If everything goes right, perhaps it will work. But in this world, you cannot guarantee that everything is going to go right with this sort of process, as complex and difficult as it will be. It therefore seems to me that there are dangers in this whole process.

However, the matter does not rest there. I am in favour of devolution. Indeed, a committee on the powers of the Welsh Assembly, which I had the honour of chairing in 2004, still forms the basis for my thinking on this matter. It is the next stage after the referendum that is important. It is said that one consequence of a no vote could be a change in the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Together with many others, I believe that a no vote would result rather in further consideration of the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom as a whole.

One interesting thing that seems to be happening is the gradual emergence of a consensus that the present constitutional structure of the United Kingdom is no longer fit. Too much power is concentrated at the centre and too little has been transferred to the nations and regions of the UK. It is a mess, grossly asymmetrical and, frankly, increasingly ineffective. Various suggestions are being made on the issue of the further devolution of powers to Scotland in the event of a no vote. All the major parties now seem to be in favour of more powers being transferred from Westminster to Holyrood.

In parentheses, I make the point that, if they are transferred to Holyrood, they certainly need to be transferred to Cardiff and Belfast. I do not believe that the priority in the event of a no vote should be just to consider the devolution of further powers; it should be to have a long, hard look at our existing constitutional structures, which would have to include an examination of the possibility of developing regional or representative structures within England. At present, in the quasi-federal system that seems to be emerging, one of the main problems is the size of England in relation to the other nations. The exact position of London and the other major cities after any change in the constitution is also profoundly difficult to clarify.

These are great and difficult issues, but something has to be done. We really cannot continue with this lopsided concentration of powers, held together by allegiance to the Queen and a rather looser one to the Westminster Parliament. The West Lothian and Merthyr Tydfil questions are not going to go away; indeed, they

are perhaps becoming more, not less, urgent. If they are going to be joined by the Marylebone conundrum—consideration of the powers that London may have in future—something has to be done.

There is strong merit in the idea of establishing a major inquiry into those constitutional issues. Whether it is called a convention or a royal commission matters not greatly, but it needs to be wide-ranging in its agenda and comprehensive in its membership. It will require intense deliberation and may take some time. It may end up with a proposal for a written constitution or it may not—I do not know how it would come out. These would be uncharted waters, but so they were for the Americas in 1776. What is important is that we should now start this process, and the Scottish referendum will give us that opportunity.

5.13 pm