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Home defence: A new 'Home Guard'?

In recent years there has been increasing awareness of the need to improve national resilience to major shocks and disruptions. This has been prompted by increasing threats against the UK and warnings by the government that Russia could attack a NATO ally by the end of the decade.

Involving the public in this effort – civil preparedness – is a major aspect of preparing for, and improving resilience to, an attack on the country. This is sometimes referred to as a “whole of society” approach to defence.

The 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), while predominantly focusing on the armed forces, expressed the need for civilian involvement in the wider defence effort.

Many civilians already volunteer with the Reserves, committing to regular training and participation in exercises and operations.

The SDR suggested an additional civilian force, modelled on the Reserves, who could help protect critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the event of a crisis or conflict.

While the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not responsible for the security of CNI, the SDR recommended it develop options for the protection of CNI in the event of crisis or conflict and present these options to the Defence Secretary by December 2026.

These options should include the potential creation of a new force modelled on the existing Reserve Forces. The MOD has confirmed that it is working on proposals. Any proposed force would likely require new legislation; the government has said it intends to bring forward a Defence Readiness Bill later in this Parliament.

This briefing sets out what the review recommended, what existing frameworks exist, and what the government has said so far.

It forms part of a series of planned Commons Library papers on defence readiness, civil preparedness and resilience ahead of expected defence legislation later in the parliamentary session.

What is Critical National Infrastructure?

Critical national infrastructure (CNI) is defined by the government as the “critical elements of infrastructure” the loss or compromise of which could have a “major detrimental impact” on the availability or delivery of essential services. The Cabinet Office has said that failure of CNI has the potential to “cause cascading and catastrophic consequences”.

According to the government, the critical elements are the “assets, facilities, systems, networks or processes, and the essential workers that operate them“.

The government has identified 13 sectors in which CNI operate. Each sector has a corresponding lead government department; for example, the chemicals sector is overseen by the Department for Business and Trade, and the food sector by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The Cabinet Office is responsible for identifying major risks and the overarching resilience system.

Isn’t CNI already protected?

The government has taken measures to protect critical national infrastructure and enhance the resilience and security of businesses. The UK Government Resilience Action Plan, which was first published in 2025, sets out the government’s response to building national resilience to potential threats and outlines the steps that individuals, businesses and civil society can take to improve collective resilience. The plan includes several measures relating to CNI, though it does not refer to the SDR’s proposal.

A government agency, the National Protective Security Authority, provides advice and assistance to those who are responsible for critical national infrastructure.

However, the 13 sectors are broad; the government itself says they encompass hundreds of thousands of assets. The SDR said “in many cases, CNI operators do not have the ability to protect the infrastructure they own in the face of such complex and evolving threats".

The Royal Navy leads on protecting undersea critical infrastructure.

What did the Strategic Defence Review recommend?

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published in June 2025, said that the MOD should explore, alongside other Government departments, "options for a ‘new deal’ for the defence of CNI, rooted in partnership between Defence and private-sector and allied operators of infrastructure that is most critical to the continuity of essential services in the UK".

The SDR also argued that there should be “additional capabilities” to ensure the protection of key sites that provide energy, food, water, telecoms, medical supplies, and transport infrastructure if needed.

Creating these additional capabilities should be the joint responsibility of organisations across government, including the MOD Guard Service (see below). However, the SDR recommended the Ministry of Defence “develop options for the protection of CNI in the event of a crisis or conflict” (recommendation 27). These options should include the development of a “new force” modelled on the existing Reserves (see below). The MOD should present these options to the Defence Secretary by the end of 2026.

The MOD has confirmed that it is working on proposals.

Why not use the armed forces?

The Ministry of Defence already has a long-standing process to provide support to other government departments and civil authorities when required. This is known as military aid to the civil authorities and more information on this can be found in Commons Library briefing Deploying the armed forces in the UK.

There are specific plans for the armed forces to support the police in extreme national emergency circumstances. For example, nearly 1,000 service personnel were deployed to guard locations across the country to “allow armed police to support the wider incident response” following the terror attack on the Manchester Arena in May 2017.

Civilian defence guarding organisations

The MOD has two separate civilian organisations that provide, among other things, specialist guarding duties.

Ministry of Defence Guard Service

The MOD Guard Service (MGS) is a civilian force dedicated to guarding the defence estate; providing site security and patrols. It is part of the Defence Infrastructure Organisation and employs about 2,000 people. Members of the guards are not armed and do not have powers of arrest.

Ministry of Defence Police

The Ministry of Defence has a specialist, national civilian police force, the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP). Its officers have the full powers and privileges of constables, identical to other civil police officers in the UK, within the jurisdiction defined by the MOD Police Act 1987. That jurisdiction is limited and largely confined to areas they protect, such as military sites, nuclear facilities and relevant government buildings. MDP officers are authorised to carry weapons. The MDP should not be confused with the Service Police, which are specialised military units that enforce discipline and investigate offences committed by the armed forces.

What form could this new force take?

The SDR did not set out an explicit structure; that is for the MOD to determine. However, it did suggest it could be modelled on the existing Reserves (see below), organised under the Reserve Forces structure, and led by the Army.

The review suggested this new force:

• Could be recruited and employed locally.
• Have a narrowly defined remit and training commitment.
• Could be armed.
• Could be equipped with basic communications, weapons, and technology such as drones.

The SDR also said that plans “must nest into the Home Defence Programme and be routinely tested and assured as part of the UK’s broader exercise programme”.

The Home Defence Programme

In 2024 the Cabinet Office established its Home Defence Programme (HDP) to build the UK’s resilience in the event of any crisis and potential escalation to conflict. Described as “an evolving and enduring programme of work which provides defence, security and resilience planning” it is focused on bringing together military and civilian efforts, including civilian assistance to the military, in the event of a crisis or hostilities affecting the UK.

In October 2025, Dan Jarvis, then a Cabinet Office minister, said that developing plans for civilian assistance to the military in a time of conflict is a “key component” of the HDP:

Working with the MoD and across Whitehall departments, the HDP will set a baseline understanding of the requirements of support that defence would need and how positions and roles may need to be backfilled in a conflict scenario. This work is ongoing.

Doesn’t the UK already have Reserve Forces?

Yes. The UK Armed Forces have long had Reserve Forces to support and supplement Regular forces (full-time Service personnel). However, the SDR said that developing “additional forces” to help protect CNI would ensure “Regulars and Reserves can concentrate on warfighting, not basic tasks”.

There are different categories of Reserve Forces. Broadly, they are:

• Volunteer Reserve: They consist of civilians who enlist on a part-time basis and have an ongoing training commitment and a mobilisation obligation. Comprising of the Army Reserve (formerly the Territorial Army), the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.
• The Strategic Reserve. This comprises members of:
  • Ex-Regular Reserve Forces: They consist of former members of the armed forces who, on discharge, are transferred to the reserves for a period of time. Members retain a legal liability to train for up to 16 days a year and to be mobilised if necessary. Comprising the Royal Fleet Reserve, the Regular Reserve and the Air Force Reserve, although they are often collectively referred to as the Regular Reserve.
  • Recall Reserve. Former members of the armed forces, who are not members of either the Volunteer Reserve or the Regular Reserve. They retain a legal liability to be recalled for permanent service into the armed forces in certain circumstances.

Al Carns, then Defence Minister, said shortly after publication of the SDR that the capabilities of the Armed Forces Reserves would be considered as part of the MOD’s work on implementing the SDR’s recommendations on Home Defence and critical national infrastructure.

Expanding the remit of the Reserves was one of the recommendations in Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton’s review of the Reserves published in 2021: “Consider strengthening critical national infrastructure and the strategic base through greater use of the reserves”.

The legislative basis of the Reserves

The Reserve Forces are governed by The Reserve Forces Act 1996. Among other things, that legislation sets out the statutory provisions regarding the composition and size of the reserve forces, the terms of service of reservist personnel, and the powers to call-out the reserves in times of national need.

The Armed Forces Bill 2026-27 would make changes to the reserve forces that will increase the recall liability of personnel in the Strategic Reserve up to the age of 65, harmonise the length of recall liability across all three services and enable the Secretary of State to issue recall orders for the Strategic Reserve for ‘warlike operations’. Individuals will also be able to transfer between the regular and reserve forces more easily. The legislation provides for opt outs to the new rules. Reforms are expected to come into force in spring 2027.

Cadets are not part of the Reserves

Cadet forces are voluntary youth organisations sponsored by the Ministry of Defence. Cadets are not members of the armed forces, they do not belong to the Reserve Force and they have no liability to serve.

Is this a new ‘Home Guard’?

Some media reports suggested the proposed force would be akin to the Home Guard created in 1940 in the UK to provide a last line of defence in the event of an invasion by Germany. Originally called Local Defence Volunteers, it quickly became the Home Guard with hundreds of thousands of men who were otherwise ineligible for regular military service. It was stood down in December 1944. Further iterations were attempted in subsequent decades (see below).

In the 1960s and 1970s the BBC broadcast a long-running popular comedy television programme about the Home Guard, called Dad’s Army. Coverage of these proposals sometimes uses this phrase.

A ‘Whole-of-Society” approach

Both the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the subsequent National Security Strategy (NSS) discussed at length the importance of a “whole-of-society” approach to national security and defence. This means using the resources and capabilities of not just the military but industry, civil society and the population at large.

The SDR argued that a “concerted, collective effort” involving industry, civil society and others will help build national resilience. The SDR said that in the event of a major war the UK should expect “sub-threshold attacks to intensify”, meaning attacks on civilian infrastructure that is essential to the functioning of the state and society.

By developing “additional forces” to help protect that infrastructure would increase resilience and strategic depth by “ensuring Regulars and Reserves can concentrate on warfighting, not basic tasks”.

The SDR also said creating such a force would help connect local communities with the wider defence family, which would in turn help build society’s understanding of what the armed forces do and increase their visibility, something the review described as “imperative”.

More information on this can be found in Commons Library briefing: What is a 'Whole of Society' approach to defence and security?

Hasn’t this been tried before?

The 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy said the government would “explore options for a wider civilian reserve” for support in times of crisis. However, this never came into being.

Professor Vincent Connelly and Paul O’Neill, associate fellows at the defence think tank the Royal United Services Institute, whilst welcoming the proposals, have warned that the track record of such organisations raised in peacetime has “historically been poor” (they gave as examples the volunteer Home Guard created in 1951 which was “quietly disbanded” in 1957 because of a lack of recruits, and the Civil Defence Corps of the 1960s and 1970s which also “struggled to recruit”).

What progress has the government made?

Senior MOD officials briefed the House of Lords National Resilience Committee on the MOD’s perspective on national resilience on 21 May 2026.

Damian Johnson, the Director of Homeland Defence and Strategic Threats, Ministry of Defence, said that the MOD is “doing a lot of work on how defence meets the SDR commitment to consider the “new deal” and does more to protect critical national infrastructure in the country”. He said work is “going on” across government to understand where “defence can and should help”, adding that “we are due to provide advice to Ministers”.

Lieutenant General Paul Griffiths, Commander of Standing Joint Command (or Homeland Joint Commander), in his capacity as operational commander, also set out the MOD’s wider plans on home defence and national resilience. The plan is called Fortitude and has four strands, or plans, two of which are relevant to these proposals:

The Sentinel plan focuses on the defence of critical national and military infrastructure. Lt Gen Griffiths said that “we are working out the plans as to how we could defend all that in times of crisis, and into conflict”.

The Genesis plan covers mass mobilisation. Lt Gen Griffiths said this is looking how to increase the size of the military workforce “perhaps with civilian volunteers to support us in times of crisis and conflict”. He said the initial focus of work is “reconnecting with the strategic reserve” and thinking about how “we would possibly mobilise and activate them in a time of crisis”.

The Defence Readiness Bill

The SDR recommended that a Defence Readiness Bill should give the government additional powers to “mobilise Reserves and industry should crisis escalate into conflict”.

In July 2026, Luke Pollard, Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, said that the government “intends to bring forward this legislation later in this Parliament”.

On 14 July 2026, Lord Harris of Haringay, the chair of the National Preparedness Commission (an independent body), led a debate in the House of Lords asking the government about progress made towards drafting the Defence Readiness Bill.

What has the reaction been?

Professor Vincent Connelly and Paul O’Neill welcomed the proposals but warned of the difficulties involved. They said legal and financial hurdles they said hobbled similar proposals made in the 1980s. They also warn recruitment could compete with efforts to recruit and increase the existing reserve forces (the SDR also recommended increasing the number of Active Reserves when funding allowed).

However, Connelly and O’Neill also set out one way a new “Home Service Force” (HSF) could work:

Forming a modern HSF, using trained ex-regulars or volunteer reserves or building on the existing volunteer reserve structures offers a cost- and operationally-effective solution avoiding the need to create a new organisation from scratch with civilian volunteers. Expanding the UK Reserve Forces for Home Defence in this way has historically proven to be flexible, credible, more likely to recruit and most cost effective. This needs to be seen as an expansion of the UK Reserve Forces, and come with additional funding, not something to be shoehorned into existing reserve budgets.

Other countries provide examples of how such a force might work. Norway’s reserve force, the Heimevernet, or Home Guard, has a wide range of tasks, including the protection of critical national infrastructure.¹ Elizabeth Braw, a member of the National Preparedness Commission (an independent body), has examined the use of Reservists in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Estonia to see what lessons can be learnt for the UK in The Reserve Potential: What the UK Can Learn from Top-Performing Allies.

Parliamentary scrutiny

Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament have opened inquiries into national resilience in 2026. These may discuss the SDR’s recommendations and progress towards developing proposals for a possible new Reserve Force:

• The House of Lords Select Committee on National Resilience, appointed in January 2026, opened in inquiry into national preparedness and resilience in March 2026.
• The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy opened an inquiry into societal resilience in April 2026.
• The House of Commons Defence Select Committee launched an inquiry into the UK’s resilience and preparedness for conflict in July 2026.

Is this a return to conscription?

There is no conscription or requirement for military service in the United Kingdom; the British armed forces are a professional volunteer force.

Conscription can be defined as the mandatory enlistment of people in their national armed forces.

Conscription has only operated for two periods in the 20^th century, between 1916 and 1920, and 1939 and 1960, respectively (the last serviceman was discharged in May 1963). 

National service continued after the Second World War with a requirement for eligible men to serve for up to two years in the UK and around the world. This enabled the government to maintain high levels of military manpower in the parts of the world where Britain had a strong presence, including Palestine, Suez and India. At the time, the government concluded that meeting these requirements could only be met effectively by continuing national service in peacetime.

Successive governments, have, since the 1960s, ruled out reintroducing national service for the armed forces, arguing that a highly trained, professional armed forces staffed by volunteers is the best way to provide for the defence of the United Kingdom.

Further information about conscription and national service in the UK and selected European countries can be found in Commons Library briefing Conscription and national service in the UK.