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Iraq

My Lords, the Prime Minister has been under considerable attack recently. Some criticism has been justified, but much has not. He deserves congratulation for the measured way in which he has dealt with the crisis in Iraq since becoming Prime Minister. It is not easy to run your forces down, to reassess and consolidate. But we have done this and now have a better balance in our relationship with the United States. We now face the difficult question of how much further to go. America’s ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, is a very sensible man. He was quoted in last Saturday’s Times as saying: "““We are in an immeasurably better place in January 2008 than in January 2007””." I share that judgment. He went on to say: "““My personal hope is that the UK will decide to maintain a division headquarters beyond 2008 as the Iraqi Government””—" and I stress that phrase— "““works to extend its authority””." Unlike the previous speaker, I do not believe that this is the end game. We have made grievous errors and we cannot walk away from them. We have to try our best to reverse the effects. There is no doubt that outside military assistance is no longer the primary mechanism for stabilising Iraq. But it is too soon for the UK to pull out all its forces. I am not aware of all the arguments, but I would be very cautious, now that we have come down to a small number of troops, about going to the next stage and pulling out completely. I come to the real question of the debate, which is whether there should be an inquiry. I argued for one on 29 June 2006 and again in the debate on 22 February 2007, and I argue for it today. The issue will not go away. Just look at today’s newspapers. The Times has the headline, ““Publish the secret document on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, ministers are told””. They are told it by the Information Tribunal, which says: "““We do not accept that we should, in effect, treat the Hutton report as the final word on the subject … Information has been placed before us which was not before Lord Hutton which may lead to questions as to whether the””," FCO head of information’s, "““draft in fact played a greater part in influencing the drafting of the [Iraq] dossier than has previously been supposed””." You cannot just dismiss these questions. There is more in the Guardian. Jonathan Steele is, as anyone who knows him will confirm, a serious foreign correspondent. He has just written a book, Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq. He concludes in an article in today’s paper: "““My interviews with diplomats produced no evidence that accurate analysis even reached the foreign secretary””." I do not know whether that is true, but we need to know. We know the analysis that was made in 1991 about whether to go to Baghdad. All of us who supported that war—I take my share of the responsibility—knew full well that there would be serious problems with the stability of Iraq if, as I believed was necessary, one toppled Saddam Hussein. One lesson has surely already been learnt. The surge has been successful. The head of the US army, who warned the United States in, I think, January 2003 that it would need 200,000 troops in Iraq, has been proven right. If we had increased the number of troops earlier, things might have been very different. When John Sawers, the British ambassador in Egypt, who had previously worked in No. 10, went into Iraq, he made a report, which we have seen. We know that he recommended—he was supported in this by Major General Albert Whitley, the most senior British officer with the US land forces—that because of the chaos that he found in Baghdad at the time serious consideration should be given in Downing Street and Whitehall generally to sending the British 16 Air Assault Brigade, which was in Iraq but due to return home, to Baghdad. There is little doubt that, if the British Prime Minister had followed John Sawers’s advice, the American Administration would not have been allowed to ““off-ramp”” the 16,000 soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division. This was the chance for Britain to make an individual decision. A serious report from a well balanced and knowledgeable diplomat recommended increasing the number of troops in Iraq to deal with the looting and the chaos, but it was overridden. This is not just about the politicians. We have to face the fact that senior diplomats in the Foreign Office have to be held to account, as do the senior generals and other senior members of the Armed Forces. We cannot just go on ignoring what they have done. I crave the indulgence of the House, as I should like to go back in history. The poem ““Mesopotamia””—what is now Iraq—subtitled ““1917””, was written by Rudyard Kipling. I thought that I would cut it but, as I think I have time, I will read it all: "““They shall not return to us, the resolute, the young, The eager and whole-hearted whom we gave; But the men who left them thriftily to die in their own dung, Shall they come with years and honour to the grave? They shall not return to us, the strong men coldly slain In sight of help denied from day to day: But the men who edged their agonies and chid them in their pain, Are they too strong and wise to put away? Our dead shall not return to us while Day and Night divide— Never while the bars of sunset hold. But the idle-minded overlings who quibbled while they died, Shall they thrust for high employments as of old? Shall we only threaten and be angry for an hour? When the storm is ended shall we find How softly but how swiftly they have sidled back to power By the favour and contrivance of their kind? Even while they soothe us, while they promise large amends, Even while they make a show of fear, Do they call upon their debtors, and take council with their friends, To confirm and re-establish each career? Their lives cannot repay us—their death could not undo— The shame that they have laid upon our race. But the slothfulness that wasted and the arrogance that slew, Shall we leave it unabated in its place?””" I beg this House of Lords, over the next few months, to make a decision and force an inquiry. In contradiction to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, whom I greatly respect, I believe that the Falklands commission did have value. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence learnt some important lessons, as did the politicians. In my profession, there is a tradition that, when you make a mistake, you have a post-mortem. It is a great tradition. Sometimes there is an actual examination of the body, but often a case conference examines where mistakes were made. I have made mistakes. Many of us have made mistakes. We should face up to them. I tried in a recent book, the Hubris Syndrome, to draw attention to some of these things, but I am really a participant. We need a dispassionate look and to learn from our mistakes.